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For the past decade, no accident law initiatives have held the
stage so conspicuously as (1)the efforts to federalize substantial
areas of tort and products liability jurisprudence, and (2) the
crafting and publication of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability.' The objective of this Article is to evaluate
selected provisions of these two endeavors through the heuristic of
the two leading rationales for modern accident law. The first and
older rationale is that of corrective justice; the more contemporary
approach is that of economic efficiency. This Article will examine
whether these two facially incongruous constructs are actually more
alike, in theory and in application, than their respective proponents
ordinarily acknowledge.
After analyzing two illustrative sections of the most recently
proposed federal reform legislation, The Product Liability Reform
Act: and one provision of the Products Liability Restatement, the
Article concludes that (1)neither the corrective justice nor the
economic efficiency analysis is more revealing than its theoretical
counterpart; and (2) the merits and shortcomings of this sampling
of Products Liability Restatement and Reform Act provisions are
equally apparent under either analysis. Put another way, a tort
rule that fails t o do justice will likely lack the deterrent effect that
is central to the argument of the economic efficiency school, and a
rule that is arguablyjust in the result reached between the parties,
but which disregards the burdens of administration or the likelihood that it will reduce risk-generating behavior, will be rejected
as irrational, wasteful, or both.
The Reform Act and the Products Liability Restatement may be
interestingly juxtaposed on numerous levels. The objective of the
Products Liability Restatement, in keeping with American Law
Institute (A.L.I. or In~titute)~
tradition, is not to reform the la\*?,
but rather t o rationalize it. It does so by reconciling to the extent
RESTATEAIENT
ClXrm~)OF TORTS:PRODUCTSLIABILITY (Proposed Find D n h , Apr. 1,
1997) bereinafter PRODUCTS
LIABILITYRESTATEAIENT].
S.648,105thCong. (1997).
The American Law Institute is a private body ofjudges,practicing attorneys, nnd legal
scholars that drafts and publishes the Restatements of various fields of tho law.
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possible conflicting state standards and creating a unified presentation of products liability law that might, the hypothesis goes,
prompt a state high court in a jurisdiction that had not ruled on
the matter to adopt the Restatement position as the optimal rule of
law?
The federal tort reform proposals, introduced in each session of
Congress for the past dozen
differ in approach, as their
pronounced objective is to "reform" a field within the civil justice
system that proponents of the legislation believe no longer functions fairly or effe~tively.~
The logic, if not the particulars, of some
proposals, such as those that would affect joint and several liability
or liability of nonmanufacturing sellers, has been endorsed in tort
reform legislation that has gained checkered adoption at the state
level.7 The presence or absence of harmonious state reform
endeavors, however, is not a predicate for congressional action.'
The Restatement and the federal tort reform activities differ not
only in objective, but also in focus; i.e., in the selection of subjects
addressed. While the Products Liability Restatement targets
substantive standards of liability, such as plaintfls prima facie
case for manufacturing, design, or informational (warnings or
instructions) defect claims: the most recent federal tort reform
proposals have for the most part avoided substantive liability
issues. Instead, the federal provisions have addressed matters of
defenses (e.g., alcohol-related plaintiff miscond~ct);'~several

ears:

'

cf. hlERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, THIS THE AMERICAN LA!\' INSTITUTE 1-4 (1996)
(describing Institute's purpose, operations, and membership).
A recitation of the as-yet Sisyphean efforts of federal tort reform proponents, dating to
1985, is set forth in the Appendix, infia p. 1097.
The Reform Act is accompanied by a report of the Committee on Commerco, Scienco,
and Transportation, S. REP.NO. 105-32 (1997). This report justifies federal legislation in
this field: "Prlhe current morass of product liability laws is a problem of national concern
that requires Congressional action. The current system of compensating peoplo injured by
defective products is costly, slow, inequitable, and unpredictable." Id. at 2.
See generally STATECAPITAL LAW FIRMGROUP,PRODUCTS LIABILITY:50 STATE
HANDBOOK
(Jerome H. Kahnke & James A. Price eds., 1995) (providing description of law
governing liability of nonmanufacturing sellers on state-by-state basis).
Modem legislation will pass substantive due process muster upon a showing that tho
legislature, in this case the United States Congress, has identified a legitimate stato
objective and that the legislation bears a "real and substantial relation to the objectivo
sought to be attained." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,625 (1934).
PRODUCE LIABILITY IUSTATEhlENT, supra note 1, $2.
lo S. 648, 105th Cong. $ 104(a) (1997).

"
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liability for noneconomic harm;" proper parties (e.g., nonmanufacturing sellers);* and damages (e.g., limitations upon and
burden of proof for punitive damages).13
These very differences make the Products Liability Restatement
and recent federal tort reform proposals an informative matrix
within which t o assess modern tort policy, whether from the private
law perspective of the American Law Institute14 or the plenary
reform authority of Congress.ls This examination will rely upon
Senate Bill 648, as an exemplar of recent federal reform efforts,
and the Products Liability Restatement. It is intended as a
preliminary evaluation of how three illustrative provisions-pertaining to warning duties, nonmanufacturing seller
liability, and joint and several liability for noneconomic harm-fare
when measured against the goals of correctivejustice-morality and
efficiency-deterrence.
First, regarding the Products Liability Restatement treatment of
warnings defects, the new Restatement puts doctrinal categories
(strict liability, negligence, warranty) aside in favor of an omnibus
definition of a warning or instruction defect.16 Second, the Reform
Act limits the doctrine of joint and several liability in section 110,
the provision addressing apportionment of noneconomic loss.
Section 110 states: "In a product liability action, the liability of
each defendant for noneconomic loss shall be several only and shall

8 110.
* I d 8 103.
'3 I d $108.
l4 In I
nconnection, Guido Calabresi and Jeffrey 0.Cooper tell the m e l o u s story in
which Justice Cardozo is said to have leveraged the Restatement ('First) of Torts position thnt
"negligence in the air" will not suffice by his prediction to the Institute thnt the yet
undecided Palsgmf v. Long Island Railroad,162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.19281, would soon take such
a position. Guido Calabresi & JeBey 0.Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30 VAL.U. L
REV. 859,867 (1996). Cardozo is said to have then employed the mtidpnted Restatement
position to bolster his arguments in the majority opinion in P&&mfi Id.
1
.
5 This Article will not discuss separately the Commerce Clause vulnernbility, if my, of
federal tort reform. SeegenemUy United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.549 (1995) (holding GunFree School Zone Act of 1990 beyond Congress's Commerce Clnuse po~~er).
l6 Section 2(c) states that, for purposes of determining liability under section 1,o. product
"is defective because of inadequate instructions or warning vrhen the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of n?nsonnble
instructions or warnings by the seller. ..." PRODUCTS LIABILITY RSTATl3IEhT, supm note
1,§ 2(c).
l1 I d
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not be joint."17 Third, under Reform Act section 103, nonmanufacturing sellers generally will be answerable in damages only upon
a showing of negligence, intentional wrongdoing, or breach of an
express warranty.18 The Reform Act provides that the plaintiff
can, nonetheless, proceed against the nonmanufacturing seller as
though it were a man~facturer'~
(i.e., in strict liability) should the
manufacturer not be amenable to in personam jurisdiction or upon
the court's determination that the manufacturer would be unable
to satisfy a judgment?' The Act also alleviates statute of limitations problems that might arise due to delays in determining that
a manufacturer would be unable to satisfy a judgment?'
Before analyzing these three provisions under modern tort law's
"root stock" principles of corrective justice and economic efficiency,
I undertake in Part I1 to survey, briefly, these two constructs. This
analysis necessitates examination of the argued distinctions
between these divergent schools of torts thinkers: (1)those who
claim that tort law's objectives of reducing accident costs22and
l7 S. 648 $110. The accompanying Senate Report explains: "[The Act] eliminates joint
liability for 'noneconomic damages' (e.g., damages for pain and suffering or omotional
distress). This means that each defendant will be liable for damages for pain and suffering
in an amount proportional to its share of fault." S. REP.NO. 105-32, at 56 (1997). Tho
Reform Act also describes the trier of fact's role in determining "percentage of responsibility"
and a resultant levy of damages against a losing defendant. S. 648 $110(b)(2). It provides
that such damages shall be "allocated to the defendant in direct proportion to tho percentago
of responsibility of the defendant," with the trier of fact assigning "tho porcontago of
responsibility of each person responsible for the claimant's harm, whether or not such porson
is a party to the action." Id. $ 110(b)(l)-(2).
S. 648 $ 103(a)(l). "In general.-In any product liability action, a product seller othor
than a manufacturer shall be liable to a claimant only if the claimant establishes [tho
existence of one of three narrow sets of fads]." Id. (emphasis supplied).
l9 Id. $ 103.
20 Id. $ 103(b)(l)(A)-(B).
"Prlhe statute of limitations applicable to claims asserting liability of (Iproduct soller
as a manufacturer shall be tolled from the date of filing of a complaint against tho
manufacturer to the date that judgment is entered against the manufacturer." Id.
0 103(b)(2).
See, e.g., Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 151 (N.J. 1979)
("Strict liability in a sense is but an attempt to minimize the costs of accidents and to
consider who should bear those costs."). Suter cites Guido Calabresi & Jon T.Hirschoff,
L.J.1055 (1972) hereinafter Calabrosi
Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81YALE
& Hirschoff, Strict Liability], and concludes: Wsing this approach, it is obvious that tho
manufacturer rather than the factory employee is 'in the better position both to judgo
whether the avoidance costs would exceed foreseeable accident costs and to act on that
judgment.' " Suter, 406 k 2 d at 152; see also Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight
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encouraging beneficial behavior are effectively validated through
the economic model of efficien~y;~~
and (2) those who urge that
these objectives are best achieved through principles grounded in
corrective justice and morality.24 Part I1 also sketches the sporadic explicit judicial recognition of these doctrines.
Part 111 analyzes the selected Restatement and Reform Act
provisions in terms of the claimed but inexact distinctions betmeen
the positions taken by the corrective justice and efficiency camps.
Part IV assesses the conclusions supported by the comparisons
made, and Part V renders preliminary conclusions regarding the
overall operative homeostasis of simultaneous de fmto application
of corrective justice and efficiency principles to accident lam. More
precisely, Part V applies the Legal Pragmatist approach advanced
by Holmes, James, and Posne? and concludes that efficiency and
corrective justice principles alike hold measurable predictive value
in gauging how tort cases have been and w i l l continue to be
decided.26 Relieved of the notion that efficiency principles should

Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212,1231 (6th Cir. 1980) (hfemtt, J., dissenting) (u[A]ccidentcosts
[can be] minimized by placing ultimate liability on the least cost nvoider.' '(citing GUIDO
CALABRESI,
TEE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: ALEGAL AND ECONO~UC
ANALYSIS(1970) [hereinnfter
CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENT^)).
Various empirical evidence supports the conclusion thnt tort reform elevntcs o v d
societal productivity and wealth. See, e.g., THOhIAS J. CAMPBELLET AL., THE CAUSESAND
OF Wrr,l'rY R
E
M
)
m SOBE EBIPIRICAL
EVIDENCE 27 (Nntionnl Bureau of Econ.
Research Wor?iing Paper No. 4989, 1995) (analyzing effect of tort reform upon industry
liability; concluding "that liabiity-reducing reforms are associnted with higher lev& of
output per worker and employment, in a broad range of industries").
=See, eg., Rocanik by Procanikv. Cillo, 478 k 2 d 755,763 (N.J. 1984) (commenting, in
context of de novo consideration of wrongful birth claim by impaired child for emotional
distress and impaired childhood: "Also a t work is an appraisal of the role of tort lavr in
compensatinginjured parties, involving as the role does, not only reason, but olso fnirness,
predictabiity, and even deterrence of future wrongful acts.").
''See infia notes 296-298 and accompanyingtext(explainingview thnt nny legal theory's
strength rests on its value for predicting future action).
26 The surmise that the law and economics and the corrective justice npproaches to
accident law may, in fact, complement each other is neither original to the author nor to
other theoretical motifs. See h W F. GRADY,CASESAND hZATERIALS ON TORTS xv (1994)
(%gal Realists oftensay that two opposing policies yield [a] legal rule thnt is just righLm
(referencingThomas C. Grey, LungdeU's Orthodbxy. 45 U.Fi'i'~.L. REV. 1(1983))). Perhnps
if, as it has sometimes been described in comparison to strict linbiity, negligence (as
classically interpreted as a standard bearer of corrective justice prinaples) is hot, nnd
economic models (at least to critics) are cold, then their mutual advnncement of nccident Inw
is "just right."
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explain all or most of civil liability, or that corrective justice
principles should do so, a Legal Pragmatist approach permits the
adoption of both corrective justice and efficiency models as means
or instruments of understanding modern tort principles and
anticipating their effect.
Some have argued that both the Products Liability Restatement
and the Reform Act are deficient in degree for lacking explicit
objectives compatible with a public policy unaffected by business or
plaintiffs' trial bar pressures. Be this criticism deserved or not,
legal theorists have underserved the debate?' The legal academic
community has mainly stayed on the sideline, declining to apply in
a comprehensive way corrective justice, economic, or alternative
theories in a broad-spectrumed manner to the leading tort initiatives of the day. In my view, legal change without an underlying
defensible public ethic risks reflecting politics over jurisprudential
processes, while philosophical exploration of tort law untied to any
objective of examiningor criticizingtoday's most important accident
law issues is simple schola~ticism.~~

I elected this subject because of my overall dissatisfaction with the level of analysis
revealed in the floor debate regarding the Products Liability Restatement and with
congressional examination of federal reform proposals advanced over the past several years.
Much of the dispute surrounding the Institute's consideration of the new Restatement
concerned whether particular provisions favored or disfavored the competing interests of
plaintiffs or defendants. See John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law
Institute Adorns a "New Cloth" for Section 402A Design Defects-A Survey of the Statcs
Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. M ~ h fL
. .REV. 493,507 (1996) (examiningProducts Liability
Restatement and concluding that it represents "[mlovement from [plro-[clonsumer to Iplro[mlanufacturer"). Similarly, the legislative history of the current Reform Act and its
predecessors has only rarely escaped the gravitational pull of politics and vested interost
polemic.
I should add that the A.L.I. Reporters and its leadership sustained the process and
Institute tradition above interest group arguments that threatened to turn the proceedings
into a legislative session.
In this regard I am pleased to see that I am not alone. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mkcd
Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1801, 1810 (1997) (finding proportion of contemporary philosophy of law scholarship to bo
"highly abstruse and abstract").
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A. GENERALLY

As tort observers have noted recently, two distinct schools of tort
philosophy currently compete for the torts flag.29 The older of the
two approaches is commonly termed corrective justice, and its
influential group of scholars hew to the position that the original
and still primary goal of tort law, including the law of products
liability, is righting wrongs caused by tortious behavior. With its
strong overlay of moral obligation, and the annulment of a
wrongdoer's unjust enrichment, the corrective justice approach
posits that tort's principal raison d'etre is to return parties suffering
personal physical injury or property damage due to another's
tortious conduct to the status quo ante, at least insofar as money
damages can so do.30
The more recently developed approach is one of economic
efficiency, an evaluation that seeks to demonstrate that the
appropriate measure of the success, or failure, of tort law ought to
proceed under an economic analysis. Richard Posner and others
call for a scientific ethic of efficiency, a so-called efficiency norm?'
Many have responded t o this call, with one commentator concluding
that "much (though by no means all) of modern tort law is a t least

29 UCurrentlythere are two major camps of tort scholars. One understands tort liabiility
as an instrument aimed largely a t the goal of deterrence, commonly explnined dthin the
framework of economics. The other looks a t tort law as a way of achieving correctivejustice
between the parties." Id. a t 1801.
419,45455
See genemlly John Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGALSTUD.
(1979) (commending "conception of tort law that rivals the dominant economic onof
employing "notions of individual moral responsibility. logically excluded from the latter");
Matthew S. O'Connell, Correcting Corrective Justice: Unscmmbling the Mired Conception
of Tort Luw, 85 GEO.L.J. 1717,1717 (1997) (aGenerallyaccepted theories of tort lnvr can be
divided into two classes: instrumental theories, which view social cost and efficiency as the
essential factors in evaluating rights and duties under the law, and noninstrumentd
theories, which view law as the vindication of a scheme of morn1 rcisponsibilitytatU).
30 See JULES
L. C O W , RISKSAND WRONGS197 (1992) (noting that one of two ways
of "understanding tort law
emphasizes its role in rectifying for vmng done").
31SeegenemllyRichard A. Posner, TheEthical and Political Basis of the Eficiency Norm
in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HO-L.
REV. 487 (1980) (discussingefficiencynorm rind
wealth maximization).

..

...
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roughly consistent with . economic analysis."32
Analytically distinguishable from these two approaches is the
question of how to go about evaluating whether any given tort rule
is socially beneficial as that term is defined by either (or both) of
these constructs. Several observers have described forbearance of
pure self interest as a touchstone of social obligation, with such
forbearance operating to encourage positive and productive
behavior and to discourage harmful or wasteful activity. That view
suggests that all of tort law can be seen as an interlocking check
against
and its too-frequent concomitant, the placement
of one's interest above the interests of others.34 Instrumentalists
(or functionalists), be they corrective justice advocates or efficiency
advocates, strive to identify effective "substantive ambitions or

32 Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377,381 (1994). A deep reservoir of scholarly criticism is directed,
however, a t efforts to identify one ascendant model of analysis to the exclusion of othors.
E.g., David G. Owen, The Mom1 Foundations of Products Liability Law: Towurd First
Principles, 68 NOTFCEDAMEL. REV. 427,433 (1993) ("Probably the clearest examplo of such
a single-value model is the theory of economic efficiency, which is often offered ns tho solo
explanatory or justificatory basis for a particular legal doctrine, an entire legnl fiold, or ovon
all of law.").
33 Cf.
BERTRAND
RUSSELL,A HISTORY
OF WESTERN
PHILOSOPHY 15 (1945) ("Civilizntion
checks impulse not only through forethought, which is a self-administered check, but nlso
through law, custom, and religion.").
Of the role of nonimmediacy in the development of duty, Russell further observed:
The civilized man is distinguished !?om the savage mainly by prudence, or,
to use a slightly wider term, forethought. He is willing to endure present
pains for the sake of future pleasures, even if the future pleasures are rather
distant. .. True forethought only arises when a man does something
towards which no impulse urges him, because his reason tells him that ho
will profit by it a t some future date.
Id.
A personal responsibility predicate to action, including action not dependent upon n
circumspect evaluation of the rights of others, was suggested by G.E. Moore in his short
volume Ethics:
Our theory holds, then, that a great many of our actions are voluntary in tho
sense that we could have avoided them, if, just beforehand, we had chosen to
do so. It does not pretend to decide whether we could have thus chosen to
avoid them; it only says that, if we had so chosen, we should hnve succeeded.
ETHICS16 (undated).
G.E. MOORE,
Cf.David G.Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 Gk L. REV. 703,720 (1992) ("Equality as n socinl
ideal may be deiined in many ways, but within a free society may perhaps best bo defined
. as requiring an 'equality of concern and respect' for the interests of other persons."
(citation omitted)).

.

..
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purposes" in the law:'
or, put differently, a causal connection
between application of a rule of law and some beneficial effect upon
social and business behavior.36 A successful functional or instrumental rule will create incentives for socially acceptable behavi ~ r . ~AS
' Cardozo put it, LtThe final cause of law is the welfare of
Thus, there is general agreement that the key to measuring the
success of tort law, be it statuto~$~or decisional, and be the
approach nominally one of corrective justice or one of efficiency,
COLEMAN,s u p m note 30, a t 200.
36ErnestWeinrib, however, disputes the modem convention thnt tort principles must be
validated through a "function" that such principles serve, such as 'efficiency" or 'corrective
justice." E
m J. WEINRIB,THE IDEA OF PRNATELAW 1-21 (1995). To Pleinrib, tort lnw
can and should be understood on and within its own terms: n unitmy, self-correcting
dynamic onto itself, and not dependent upon any external logic or objective. Id. nt 5.
Weinrib nevertheless argues that Aristotelian concepts of restorntion of equality found
modem voice in Immanuel Kant's "equal rights" conception of law, nnd thnt the AristotelinnRantian philosophical continuum, discussed infm notes 56-60,69-74 nnd nccompmyingtcxt,
constitute the core precepts of modem corrective justice principles. Id a t 20. In PIcinrjb's
words: ?Private Law makes correctivejustice and Kantian right explicit by nctudizing them
in doctrines, concepts, and institutions that coherently fit together." Id Thus, even while
rejecting an explicit "instrumentalistn or, in Weinrib's term, 'functiond~st]" approach to
doctrinal evaluation, he would agree that application of modern correctivejustico principles,
more often than not, result in just and moral decisions. See id a t 8-16 (describing private
law's imperatives towards "internal intelligibility," 'coherence: nnd Whry structure," as
aided by the selfcorrecting processes of appellate review).
With Weinrib's view, compare RICHARD
A. POSNER,THE PROBLEhS OF JURISPRUD~CE
29
(1990):
Legal rules are to be viewed in instrumental terms, implying contestnbility,
revisabiity, mutability. "Few rules in our time are so well estnblished that
they may not be called upon any day to justify their existence ns menns
adapted to an end. If they do not function, they are disensed. If they ore
diseased, they need not propagate their bind. .. In the endless process of
testing and retesting, there is a constant rejection of the dross. the tide
rises and falls, but the sands of error crumble."
(quoting BENJAMINN. CARDOZO,
THE NATUREOF THE JUDICIALPROCESS 98-99, 177, 179
(1921)).
In seeming agreement with Weinrib, Holmes described his objectives in hvo key lectures
anticipating The Common Luw as an effort "to discover whether there is m y common ground
a t the bottom of all liability in tort, and if so, what that ground is." OLIVER PIENDELL
Horn=, THE C o h l h ~ oLAW
~ 63 (hlark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963).
Weinrib's self-imaging private law would achieve l i e results through its orgnnic
imperative towards "internal intelligibility? See WEINRIB, s u p m note 36, nt 8-16 (npplyhg
internal, rather than functionalist, viewpoint to private law).
CARDOZO,
s u p m note 36, a t 66.
For example, a state codification of a liability standard for design defect.
35

.

..

"
"
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reposes in examination of whether the liability analysis and conclusion has the ability to influence behavi~r.~'In this Article I will
employ the orthodox instrumentalist inquiry in evaluating whether
the three provisions that are the Article's focus have the potential
to shape behavior in ways that advocates of corrective justice and
efficiency both view as fa~orable.~'An orientation t o my hypothesis that the similarities in application and result (although not in
ideation) between the corrective justice and efficiency approaches
outweigh the distinctions, and that these similarities will be
revealed in the evaluation of the new Restatement and Reform Act
provisions,.may prove helpful. To provide a brief example of the
application of my theory, I suggest that if there exists any material
divergence between the effect, in theory and in application, of the
corrective justice-morality and the efficiency-deterrence analyses,
such a variance would be manifested in either or both of two
modern and widely-noted tort claims: (1)the products liability
claim involving the scalding hot McDonald's coffee; and (2) the
mass environmental catastrophe arising from the grounding of the
Exxon Valdez.
Applying an instrumental or functional standard first t o the
coffee spill, the applicable tort rule of negligence would be successful if, following the plaintiffs verdict, fast food restaurants served
coffee at lower temperatures. Regarding the oil spill, the doctrine
of public nuisance4' would be considered successful, again from an
40 COLEMAN,
supra note 30, a t 203. Weinrib, again, would agree that whether tho
objectives were generated externally (the instrumentalist or functionalist approach) or
internally (Weinrib's contention), all private law is judged ultimately by whether it nchiovos
a just result between the pahies. WE-,
supra note 36, at 20.
Even in an environment of imperfect information, as society becomes ever moro familiar
with the corpus of such private law decisions, and is persuaded, ideally, by its fnirness and
morality, actors will predictably be influenced (if not directed) in their future behavior by
their perception of how the civil justice system will resolve future disputes.
"mnstrumentalists believe that tort law has goals. We can distinguish nmong
instrumentalists in terms of the goals each believes are appropriate to tort law. Tho
important dichotomy is between moral and economic instrumentalists." COLEam, supra
note 30, at 203.
REsTATEhlENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS 8 821C(1) (1979); see also GERALD
W.BOSTON & M.
STUARTMADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONhIENTAL AND TOXIC TORTS: CASES,bfATERIAlS AND
PROBLEMS46-47, 51-56 (1994) (recognizing importance of special injury requirement for
public nuisance actions by private individuals); JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING
TORTS380-82 (1996) (defining elements of public nuisance); M. STUART
MADDEN, TOXIC
TORTS DESKBOOK
37-38 (1992) (noting that plaintss who sustain special injuries aro ablo

''
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instrumental or functional perspective, if, following findings for
plaintiffs, tanker owners commenced to be more probing in their
evaluation of the fitness of vessel captains.43
Taking the hypothetical one step further, the predicted behavioral modification of fast food restaurateurs could be claimed by
corrective justice and efficiency adherents alike as a validation of
their respective approaches. From the standpoint of corrective
justice, and examining only the scalding coffee paradigm, compensation of the injured patron (1)satisfies tort l a d s victim-compensation objecti~e;~
(2) annuls McDonald's unjust enrichment a t
having cultivated a public perception that its coffee mould remain
hot longer (certainly a mere luxury) at the social cost of an
increased risk of scalding incidents;45and (3) operates to deter
continued fast food sale of unnecessarily hot coffeeP6
From an efficiency-deterrence standpoint, imposition of liability
upon McDonald's would be economically rational as it (1)corrects
McDonald's market misbehavior at having eluded a protocontractual agreement with patrons47(e.g., a sign beneath the Golden
Arches stating "Scalding Coffee Sold Heren); (2) places liability
upon the party in the position to most inexpensively detect, and
perhaps correct, the risk;48 and (3) in purely social cost terms,
reaches a conclusion that has widespread if not universal approval
that we assign a greater economic value (in the sense of reduced
to bring public nuisance actions as individuals rather than as representatives of public).
"Of course other risk reduction responses would be nvnilnble to vessel owners, such ns
the double hulling of vessels. The costs of such risk reduction, hovrever, might seem too
great to achieve the elimination of episodic contaminant spills.
" See genemUy Richard W. Wright, Right, Justice and Tort Law, in m s o p m m
FOUNDATIONS
OF TORT
LAW159 David G. Owen ed., 1995) (nrying thnt true foundntion of
tort law is correctivejustice,not efficiency theory).
" Cfi Linda Ross Meyer, J u s t the Facts?, 106 YALEL.J. 1269, 1299 n.161 (1997)
(describiig'the difficultyin correlatinga defendant's wrong with n victim's hnrmm(reviewing
DONDFSVEESET L, EXPLORING m D o h m OF ACCIDENTLAW T
~ THEGFACIS
SERIOUSLY
(1996))). Annulment is conceptually distinct from corrective justico in thnt it
could occur by civil fine rather than by victim compensation.
See Schwartz, supm note 32, a t 381-87,403-13 (collecting literature analyzing success
of tort law in deterring negligent conduct).
"Cfi Lynn A. Stout,Are Takeover Premiums R e d y Premiums? afarkt Price, Fair Vabe
and Corpomte Luw, 99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990) (examining ex ante and expost models of stock
pricing).
See Sharlene W. Lassiter, Fmm Hoofto Hambwgec TheFiction of So/e AfcaL Supply,
33 W
L. REV. 411,418 (1997)(concluding thnt meat producer is lcnst cost nvoidcr).
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accident costs) to relatively risk-free egress from fast food lanes
than we do on the marginal social benefits of a small number of
additional minutes during which our coffee remains hot?'
Putting aside any need for agreement with the above premises,
a like evaluation of the three provisions that are the subject of this
Article should reveal preliminarily if what may have been a bona
fide categorical distinction between efficiency and corrective justice
principles has maintained its originating rationale; or whether,
instead, the two approaches have with time come into rough
alignment with one another. The following two Sections describe
in a concise fashion selected constructs within both the corrective
justice-morality approach and the efficiency-deterrenceposition that
provide a means of comparing and contrasting the chosen Reform
Act and Products Liability Restatement provision^.^^
B. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE-MORALITY

In general terms, corrective justice proponents advance the
proposition that the judiciary should promote a rights-based
jurisprudence grounded in moral precept^.^' Even among those

See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1(1960).
Application of analytical approaches other than these, such as distributive justico, is
beyond the scope of this Article. Cf: JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORYOF JUSTICE
73, 179 (1971)
(stating that justice requires "rnitigatrion ofl the influence of social contingencies and natural
misfortune on distributive shares" and "an undertaking to regard the distribution of natural
abilities as a collective asset so that the more fortunate are to benefit only in ways that holp
those who have lost out"), discussed in RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN,SIMPLERULESFOR A COIIWLEX
WORLD54 (1995); Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to
L. REV. 515 (1992) (reviewing different analytical constructs,
Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA
including that of distributive justice).
See Vincent A. Wellman, Conceptions of the Common Law: Reflections on a Theory of
Contract, 41 U.
L. REV. 925,925 n.l(l987) (citing RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING
RIUIITS
SERIOUSLY
1-130 (rev. ed. 19771, in which Dworkin "propound[sl a rights-based theory of law
and a correspondingobligation ofjudges to consider moral precepts when deciding significant
cases"). Compare the following assertion made by Immanuel Kant:
I assume that there are pure moral laws which determine, purely a priori,
(without regard to empirical motives, that is, to happiness) what is and is not
to be done, that is, which determine the employment of the freedom of a
rational being in general; and that these laws command in an absolute
manner (not merely hypothetically, on the supposition of other empiricnl
ends), and are therefore in every respect necessary.
1 h l h ~ I(ANT,
~ ~ LCRITIQUEOF PURE
REASON 636-37 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., 1965).
49
M,
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observers who would not subscribe wholeheartedly to this proposition, there is probably a consensus that if moral precepts are not to
be the primary values supported, justice and morality-based goals
still form part of the foundation of modern tort lawss2
The moral authority of any law turns upon the perception that
its tenets lead to just results.53 Most contemporary observers
would agree that a core consideration in any modern contemplation
of "justice" would be the goal of "corrective" justice, i.e., a result
that to the extent possible deprives the wrongful party of his gain,
and restores the injured party to the position he enjoyed before the
harm." Holmes explained: "Be the exceptions more or less
numerous, the general purpose of the law of torts is to secure a

52 It is agreed generally that only a wrong can transgress a m o d imperative, in the
sense that a harm befalling a plaintiffwith no predicate negligence or violntion of some other
doctrinal imperative, such as liabity for abnormally dangerous nctivities, creates no
rectiiicatory duty of any actor. Weinrib might point to tort doctrine as common Inw in which
wrongdoingis a necessary, but not individually sufficient, component of linbility. See hfnrtia
k Kotler, Utility,Autonomy and Motive.- A Descriptive hfodel of the Development of Tort
Doctrine,58 U. CIN.L. REV. 1231,1240 (1990) CMrongdoing of a party is an essential fnctor
in the decision to impose liabity. ? (citing Ernest J. Weinrib, The hiorality of Tort Lav?,
Address to the Tort Law Section, Association of American Law SchoolsAnnual hieeting (Jnn.
9, 1988))). Cf. HENRY SU~INER
hlAINE, ANCIENTLAW: ITS CONNECTION WlTH THE EARLY
~
R OF SOCIETY,
Y
AND ITSRELATION TO ~ ~ [ O D E RIDEAS
N
127 (1866) (Suggesting that in
primitive times, before individuals were generally bnceived as altogether separate" from
family or community, "[tlhe moral elevation and moral debasement of the individunl appear
to be confounded with, or postponed to, the merits and offen[s]es of the group to tvhich the
individual belongs").
"See READINGSIN JURISPRUDENCE
37 (Jerome Hall ed., 1938) ('As Auystine snys (Do
Lib. Arb i5), that which is not just seems to be no law a t alk wherefore the firce of a law
depends on the extent of its justice? (emphasis added)); cf. Randy E. Bamett, Getting
Nonnative: The Role ofNaturalRi9hts in Constitutiod Adjudication, 12 CONST. C O W 93,
105-13 (1995) (arguing that for constitutional procedures to be legitimate, they must be of
such a nature as to b i d in conscience).
Jules L. Coleman, The Pmctice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICALFOUNDATIONS
OF TORT IN??,
supm note 44, a t 53 (a[C]orrectivejustice is the principle thnt those who nre
responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair them, and thnt the core
of tort law embodies this conception of corrective justice.").
m e civil] law nobody overlooks, the rewards and punishments that enforce
it being ready at hand, and suitable to the power that makes it; vrhic. is the
power of the commonwealth, engaged to protect the lives, liberties, and
possessions of those who live according to its law; and hns power to tolre
away life, liberty, or goods from him who disobeys ..
John Locke, Theory of Knowledge: Essay Concerning Human U h t a n d i n g , in LOCICE:
SELECTIONS203 (Sterling P.Lamprecht ed., 1928).
The term "corrective" in "corrective justice" has been considered synonymous with the
terms "rectificatory" or "commutative." POSNER,supm note 36, a t 313.

..

"

..
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man indemnity against certain forms of harm to person, reputation,
or estate, at the hands of his neighbors . . n55
Although codification now plays a significant role in products
liability law, the earliest judicial revelation of corrective justice
principles was through common-law adjudication. The origins of
the common law, in turn, can be traced at least from A r i ~ t o t l e ~ ~
and C i ~ e r othrough
~~
the book of Exodu~.'~In Book V, chapter
2 of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is credited with laying the
cornerstone of the corrective justice principles of today's common
law.59 Under the Aristotelian corrective principle of diorthotikos,
or "making straight," at the remedy phase the court will attempt

..

HOL~~ES,
supra note 36, at 115 (emphasis added). In addition, Henry Maine observes:
Now the penal Law of ancient communities is not the law of Crimes; it is the
law of Wrongs, or, to use the English technical word, of Torts. The person
injured proceeds against the wrong-doer by an ordinary civil action, and
recovers compensation in the shape of money-damages if he succeeds.
[AU such Torts] gave rise to an Obligation or vinculum juris, and wore all
requited by a payment of money.
W,supra note 52, at 370.
56 See generally H.H. JOACHIM,
A R I S ~ THE
: NICO~~ACHEAN
ETHICS(D.A. Rees ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1955) (1951).
Cicero describes with particularity a natural law-correctivejustice deterrence objectivo:
Of all these things about which learned men dispute there is none more
important than clearly to understand that we are born for justice, and that
right is founded not in opinion but in nature. There is indeed a true law,
right reason, agreeing with nature and d i h e d among all, unchanging,
everlasting, which calls to duty by commanding, deters from wrong by
forbidding.
BENJA~IIN
FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR,AMERICAN
INTERPRETATIONS
OF NATURAL
hw A STUDY
IN THE HISTORYOF POLFTICAL
THOUGHT
5 (1931) (quoting CICERO,DE LEGIBUS11); see also
SURYA
PRAKASH S m WHATIS LAW?57-58 (1989) (discussing CiceroJsphilosophy of law).
~3'The earliest reference to punitive damages can be found in Exodus 22:9, where it is
prescribed that one found guilty of taking another's property be required to pay back doublo
what was taken." James J. Restivo, Jr., Insuring Punitive Damages, NAT'I.L.J., July 24,
1995, a t C1, C1.
69
[Tlhe law ...treats the parties as equal, and asks only if one is the author
and the other the victim of iqjustice or if the one inflicted and the other has
sustained an injury. Injustice in this sense is unfair or unequal, and the
endeavor of the judge is to equalize it.
ARISTOTLE, NlCOhWHEAN ETHICS
154(J. Welldon trans., 19871, discussed in David G. Owen,
The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 AWL L. REV. 705, 707-08 & n.6 (1989).
Jeremy Waldron has suggested that assignment of this important concept to Aristotle rests
upon a slender reed, stating that "the attribution is based on a rather free and simplistic
translation of a very obscure passage . in the Nicomachean Ethics." Jeremy Waldron,
Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORTLAW,
supra note 44, at 387, 392 (citing A R I s m , NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS114-17 (1V.D. Ross
trans., 1954).
65

.. .

..
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t o equalize things by means of the penalty, taking away
fiom the gain of the assailant. For the term "gain" is
applied generally to such cases, even if it be not a term
appropriate to certain cases, e.g. t o the person who
inflicts a wound-and 'lossn to the sufferer. . . . frlhe
judge restores equality . . . .60
Concepts of "natural law" likewise provide a tie between
corrective justice and considerations of morality. One of the three
alternative delinitions of natural law offered by Benjamin Fletcher
Wright, Jr., was that "natural law" comprised "principles of right,
principles which are established or which should be established if
justice is to prevail.*' The "morality" backdrop of natural law
was noted by Posner in his characterization of "natural la# as
"basic political morality.*2
As a corollary to its rectificatory goal of setting matters straight
between the parties, the corrective justice model sets forth the
broader societal objective of reducing the occurrence of similar
wrongs in the future. The corrective justice objective of deterrence
is evidenced in such early writings as that of one academic author,
who in 1890 wrote of the goals of the negligence action in these
words:
The really important matter is to adjust the dispute
between the parties by a rule of conduct which shall do
justice if possible in the particular case, but which shall
also be suitable to the needs of the community, and tend

2 THE COBIPLETE
WORKS OF ARISrOTLE 1786 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984). "It is for
this reason also," Aristotle continues. "that it is called just [dihaion],because i t is a division
into two parts [di.]... and the judge [dikasfes] is one who bisects [dichostesl .
Therefore the just. . consists in having an equal amount before and aher the transaction."
Id. a t 1787. Seegenemlly EFSTEIN,supm note 50, a t 9 1 (asserting thnt tort limy "deals with
how to protect the things that you have"); Richard W. Wright, Substantive CorrectiueJustice,
77 IOWA
L. REV. 625 (1992) (discussing varied concepts of corrective justice).
WRIGHT, supra note 57, a t 3; see also &I.Stuart hfadden, The Vital Common Lam Its
Role in a Statutory Age, 16 U. ARK.
ROCK L.J. 555,572 (1996) ( d i s a s i i g PlrighM
alternative dehitions of natural law).
POSNEFt, supra note 36, a t 230.

...

.
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to prevent like accidents fkom happening in the fut~re."~~
Critics of the corrective justice model turn regularly to the
argument that a corrective justice-morality model does little to
reduce accident costs as it does not deter risk-creating behavior in
any material way,64if for no other reason than that risk-creating
behavior resulting in no harm conventionally triggers no penalty
for the actor. Upon closer examination, however, devaluation of the
deterrence effect of the corrective justice-morality principles is
overstated. Even those who question the level of the deterrent
effect of tort law65concede that it delivers a "moderate amount of
deterren~e."~~
Thus, as the quantum of deterrent effect of corrective justice principles will continue to be que~tioned,~'sound
arguments can be made that tort law's corrective justice attributes
carry with them a strong incentive to beneficial conduct, or put
another way, a deterrence to substandard conduct. The decisional
law with virtually no dissent repeats a deterrence role in accident
law, without specifically assigning this result t o the operation of
either corrective justice or efficiency principles.68 When those
63WilliamSchofield, Davies v. Mannr Theory of Contributory Negligence, 3 HARV.L. REV.
263,269 (1890); accord Barrett v. Superior Court (Paul Hubbs Constr. Corp.), 272 Cd.Rptr.
304,308 (Ct. App. 1990) (interpretingterm "wrongful actminwrongful death statuto to mean
tortious ad). The Barrett court commented further that by choosing not to limit the measure
of damages, "California has chosen 'to strengthen the deterrent aspect of tho civil sanction:
"the sting of unlimited recovery. .more effectively penalize[sl the culpable defondnnt and
deterrs] it and others similarly situated from such future condud"
rather than to protect
defendants from excessive financial burdens." Barrett, 272 Cal Rptr. at 308 (citations
omitted); see also Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283,291 (Ct. App. 1985)
(stating one principal purpose of strict liability was "to provide an economic incontivo for
improved product safety").
See, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort
Compensation, 75 TEX.L. REV. 1567, 1601 (1997) C"'n demanding that the tortfeasois
payment go to the tort victim-rather than the state, for example-corrective justice remains
distinct f?om deterrence.").
65 E.g., Schwartz, supra note 32, a t 379.
Id.
Id.; cf: Wright, supra note 60, at 626 (noting disagreement on effects of corroctivo
justice principles).
See, e.g., Barrett, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 309-10 (noting that one purpose of strict liability is
"to provide an economic incentive for improved product safety" and that allowing heirs to
recover under strict liability would operate "to deter foreseeable wrongful conduct and to
allocate the cost of iqjury"); Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679 k 2 d 106,111 (N.J.1996) (Tho god

.
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disputing the vitality of a deterrence role achieved by decisions
tracking correctivejustice principles are largely academicians, I am
inclined to side with the conclusions of the judges who try the cases
and read the records.
Furthermore, philosophical support for the incentive effect of
corrective justice principles can be found in the "categorical
imperativenor "equal rightsnteaching of Immanuel K ~ I I ~ .Kant's
~'
"moral philosophy" "takes as its central theme the idea of selflegislated law," i.e., the view that "[tlhe democratic community
stands in the same relation to the laws it makes as the moral
individual does to his own self-determined imperatives of acti01.1."~'
To Kant, "pure reason's first practical function . . . is to
make us cognizant of the moral law: the paradigm of universalizability to which maxims of objectively correct actions would conform.n71 .A law's "universalizability," i.e., its applicability to all
persons however circumstanced in relationship or in relative
empowerment, gives rise to an equal rights attribute to Kant's
philosophy-specifically, Kant's "categorical imperativen: "Act only
according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time v d l
that it should become a universal law.n72

of deterrence, acknowledged generally to be part of tart larv, is especinlly important in the
field of products-liabiity law. .. mhis state has a strung interest in encouraging the
manufacture and distribution of safe products . and, conversely, in deterring the
manufacture and distribution of unsafe products . .");West Am. Ins. Co. v. Obrding, 451
k 2 d 239,242-43 (Pa Super. Ct. 1982) (noting @deterrenteffect caused by product liability
suits"); Webb v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 692 k 2 d 343,346 (Vt. 1996) (explaining that
strict liabiity "protects the consumer .by creating an incentive for mnnufacturers to
produce safe products, ... or as other courts have stated, a deterrence to producing
unreasonably dangerous products" (citations omitted)).
Weinrib suggests, indeed, that Kant's equality precepts represent the essential bridge
between Aristotelian corrective justice and the modem 'ethiad foundation for tart lavz?
POSNER,supm note 36, a t 328-29 (discussing Ernest J. Weinrib, Toruard a hforal Theov of
Negligence Law, 2 L. & PHIL. 37 (1983)).
nt xxi
OF C R ~ C A L
Robert Paul WOE,Infroduction to KANT: A COLLU;TION
(Robert Paul W O EecL, 1967).
Paul Dietrichson, What Does &nt Mean by 'Acting from Duty?, in KAhT: A
COLLECPION
OF CRITICALESSAYS,
supm note 70, a t 314.
Immanuel Rant, Ground& for the Metaphysics of hfomls, in ETHIOU.PHILOSOPHY 1.
30 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1983)(1785); accord I ~ ~ ~ W L K A ~THE
T,
M~APHYSICAL
ELE~IENTS
OF JUSTICE
35 (John Ladd trans., 1965)(3Ience the universal lavr
of justice is: a d externally in such a way that the free use of your rvill is compatible viith
the freedom of everyone ...."I.

.
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..

..

"
"

Heinonline - - 32 Ga. L. Rev. 1035 1997-1998

GEORGLA LAW REVIEW

1036

Pol. 32:1017

Paul Dietrichson writes that "the legality' requirement of
[Kant's] categorical imperative [is satisfied] if and only if our action
is such that we could at any time consistently want a universal
causal law of voluntary action to become modeled on the principle
of our maxim of action."73 Unanswered in this proposition is the
following question: What constitutes our incentive t o conform our
behavior t o a premise of moral law categorically or universally
applied? Kant seemingly suggests that our objectively correct
conduct can spring not exclusively from subjective fidelity to duty
("from duty"), but likewise "according to duty," which is to say from
a "prudential" or pragmatic motivation or incentive.74 And what
is a pragmatic motivation or incentive but a deterrent from
pursuing incompatible behavior?
A conspicuous component of tort law is its rich array of objective
standards of conduct, in effect Kantian "duties." While Kant
attributes the relationship between law and behavior to each
person's internal sense of duty, the Legal Realist or Legal Pragmatist analysis suggested by Holmes departs from this explanation.
Under this alternate approach, tort law's imposition of external
standards of conduct serves less to buy, affect or co-opt the moral
position of the population than to put persons on notice of the
behavior expected of them to avoid liability. In Holmes's words:
The true explanation of the reference of liability to a
moral standard . . . is not that it is for the purpose of
improving men's hearts, but that it is to give a man a
fair chance to avoid doing the harm before he is held
responsible for it. It is intended to reconcile the policy
of letting accidents lie where they fall, and the reasonable freedom of others with the protection of the individual from injury?'
xi

Dietrichson, supra note 71, at 315-16.

"Id. at 316. As Dietrichson elaborates:
An example [of prudential motivation] would be when a merchant abstains
from cheating his customers because, and only because, he thinks cheating
would be too risky for him. But Kant insists that any human being who can
properly be called a person knows his actions should satisfy, not only tho
requirement of legality (objective correctness), but also the requirement of
morality (subjective worthiness).
Id.

" Horn=,

supra note 36, at 115.
Heinonline - -

3 2 Ga. L.

Rev.

1036 1997-1998

19981

CORRECTNE JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY

1037

Just what is Holmes's "fair chance to avoid" behavior so as not to
be held responsible for it? In tort, for example, the triggering event
for imposition of responsibility for another's loss begins with
"knowledge" as the "starting-point," followed by examination of the
"circumstances" that %auld have led a prudent man to perceive
danger, although not necessarily to foresee the specific harm."76
What are such "circumstancesn-Holmes asks-and answers,
experien~e."~~
On a higher level of generality, corrective justice principles in
tort are intended to minimize not only the personal physical injury
effect of accidents but also to lessen the intrusions such accidents
work upon others' autonomy and liberty interests. Corrective
justice is suited to mediation of claims arising from unconsented-to
intrusions upon personal autonomy and wrongfid interference with
individual freedom. Personal autonomy is stated repeatedly to be
part of that bundle of modern citizenship rights, the perimeters of
which law should mediate.78 A dictionary defines "autonomy" as
"independence or freedom."79 If to "freedom" we add the correlative right of "liberty," which has been defined as "freedom f?om
external control or interference, obligations, etc.; freedom to
choose,"s0 Richard Epstein argues that among the first "task[sln
of a common-law doctrine such as torts "is to define the boundaries
of individual liberty."81 In other common-law precincts, such as
the laws governing private property, preservation of an actor's
interests in liberty and freedom are recognized and justified as an
enhancement of the owner's "reasonable autonomy."=
L(

76

Id at 117.

Id.
E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 363 (Tex. 1993) CDuggert, J.,
dissenting) ('The requirement that manufacturers provide adequate vmrning serves the d u d
goals of tisk reduction and the protection of individud autonomy in dedsion-making.'
(quoting PAGEmEMN ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETONON TEIE LAW OF TORTS 8 96, at 685
(5th ed. 1984)); see also in@ notes 149-166 and accompanying text (describing wnrning
requirements of Restatement (Second) of Torts and Products Liabilify Restatement and
purpose of those requirements as allowing individuals to make informed choices).
19 THE%ANDOII¶
HOUSE
COLLEGE D I ~ O N A R
92Y(Jess Stein ed., rev. ed. 1975).
80 Id. a t 772.
Richard k Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGALSTUD. 151,203 (1973).
* JOHN
M ~ X E L LFINNIS,NATURAL
LAWAND NATURAL
RIGIFIS 173 (19801, discussed in
David G. Owen, Products Liability: Principles of Justice for the 21st Century, 11PACEL.
REV. 63,65 & n4(1990); cf. EPSTEIN, s u p m note 50, a t 92: T h e primnry objective of tho tort
law is to allow people to live in peace (if not in harmony) with each other. It edorces the
78

Heinonline - - 32 Ga. L. Rev. 1037 1997-1998

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

In The Morality of Freedom, Joseph Raz writes that "[alutonomy
requires that many morally acceptable options be available to a
person,"83 a standard that imposes limitations upon an actor's
prerogatives to trammel such "morally acceptable" options as may
be available to those affected by the actor's conduct. By way of
example, imagine that workers compensation laws precluded not
only negligence-based suits against the employer, but also claims
against a manufacturer or seller of an industrial product that
carried inadequate warnings or instructions. Assume further that
such inadequate warnings were the legal cause of a worker's toxinrelated injuries. If one were to take into account the fact that for
most, nonemployment as opposed to employment is not a true
option, the typical worker would be left in some measure coerced
into tolerating the risk. Thus, the ex ante maintenance of a
hazardous workplace would be, according to Raz, an invasion of or
constriction of the worker's autonomy interests.
The same analysis applies beyond the industrial product context,
in the area of consumer sales. In evaluating a seller's autonomy or
liberty interests, the effect of the seller's conduct on the buyer's
correlative autonomy and liberty interests must be determined. A
product sold with inadequate warnings would breach the buyer's
automony interests by denying him the opportunity t o make an
informed choice as to whether the benefits enjoyed in encountering
a risk exceeded the potential negative consequences. In the view
of the reasonable purchaser, therefore, sale of a defective and
unreasonably dangerous product would be a violation of an
autonomy interest to which corrective justice principles would
properly respond.
Our society's commitment to protecting individual autonomy and
liberty is expressed in the earliest of our legal system's organizing
As society has recognized a
principles in the Con~titution.~~
fundamental right to pursue lawful activity without wrongfid
interference of others, it has recognized similarly the right to do so
separate domains in which all of us, singly, can live our own lives as we see fit."
JOSEPH RAZ,RIE MORALITY
OF FREEDOM 378 (1986).
"In his dissent in the Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (18721, Justico Fiold
described the import of the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of U.S. Constitution Articlo
IV,Section 2, and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as ensuring that 5vhich of right
belong[sl to the citizens of all free governments." Id. at 97 (Field, J., dissenting).
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without undue risk of personal physical harm. Another's autonomy
or liberty interest extends, as it were, to the tip of your nose and no
farther. Epstein explains: "Elhe law of tort does not end with the
recognition of individual liberty. Once a man causes harm to
another, he has brought himself within the boundaries of the law
of tort."85 Congruently, a tort rule that gives notice that an actor
may be liable in money damages for behavior that proceeds without
due care for the autonomy interests of others, and that causes
damage or injury thereby,. serves the deterrence objective of
corrective justice, noted by Holmes, of giving the actor a "fair
chance to avoid."s6
In sum, in any evaluation of corrective justice, considerations of
fairness are intehvined with those of autonomy and freedom.
Fairness may have an individual or a collective focus. While a tort
rule's impact upon aggregate fairness may bear upon society's
corrective justice focuses primarily upon
perception of its
making specific injured parties whole, i.e., in reaching a fair and
just result as to the parties before the court. Simply put, "the loss
of fkeedom for some is [not] made right by a greater good shared by
~ t h e r s . " To
~ Gregory C. Keating, "[ilf 'the concept and language
of justice [are] the test . . . by which any area of law must be
judged,' then within the law of enterprise liability, the principle of
fairness must have priority over the policy of wealth-maximizati01.1."~~
C. EFFICIENCY-DETERRENCE

Economic analysis of tort law is not limited to one analytical
construct. One vantage point from which an economic observation
Epsteii, supm note 81, at 204. Epstein continues:
It does not follow, however, that he will be found liable in each and every
case in which it can be show[n] that he caused harm, for it may still be
possible for him to escape liability, not by an insistence u p n his freedom of
action, but upon a specific showing that his conduct was either excused or
justiiied.
Id.
as Horns, supm note 36, at 115.
87 E.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870,871 (N.Y.1970) (noting public
law and private law initiatives regarding air pollution).
BS Gregoly C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness i
n the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 hUCH.
L. REV. 1266,1379 & 11.257 (1997) (citation omitted).
g3 I d at 1379-80 (citation omitted).
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of products liability rules may be made, known as "utilitarian
theory," invites the assessment of the relative social cost associated
with favoring one course of conduct over another. Coase, with his
example of the physician and the confe~tioner,~~
prompts application of utilitarian theory to the products liability context, in which
the question might be posed this way: Is it worthwhile to restrict
or encumber product availability in order to achieve marginally
safer products, or, considering social cost, is it preferable to ensure
a broader range of products, conceding that more products with
marginally higher potential for harm will exist in the market?
Thus seen, much of modern tort policy disagreement, be it described theoretically or in terms of tort rules' practical effect on
plaintiffs and defendants as a whole, concerns how much social and
economic cost we are prepared to incur in order to maintain product
a~ailability.~'

See Coase, supm note 49, a t 13 (in setting where confectioneis operation causes
disturbance to physician's practice, appropriate question not who should componsnto
physician in nuisance, but rather whether social costs and gains are best served by
preservation of status quo, by cessation of confectioneis activities, or by cessation of
physician's activities).
Perhaps on an inchoate level, the congressional authors of the Reform Act appreciated
the need for an obeisance directed towards efficiencies over and above statements required
to accompany federal legislation. Illustrative of such an efficiency-consciousjustification is
found in the authors' apparent conclusion that only economic benefits will flow from tho
proposed legislation. In the report accompanying the Reform Act, it is claimed:
REGULATORY
WACT
STATEMENT
In accordance with paragraph ll(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of
the Senate, the Committee provides the following evaluation of the regulatory
impact of the legislation, as reported.
NUMBER OF PERSONS AFFECl'ED

The purpose of this product liability reform legislation, as reported, is to
provide greater certainty as to the rights and responsibilities of all thoso
involved in product liability disputes, to reduce transaction costs, to reliavo
the burden imposed on interstate commerce by the present product liability
litigation system, and to ensure the continued availability of biomaterials for
implantable medical devices. It is anticipated that it will affect the conduct
of those involved in product liability disputes by making a number of
significant changes in the laws that are applicable to all product liability
actions. This legislation does not change the jurisdiction of state or federal
courts. Thus, the number of persons affected should be consistent with
current levels.
ECONOMIC IMPACT

It is anticipated that this legislation will result in substantial cost and
paperwork savings to all parties affected by product liability lawsuits. First,
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Another perspective that has played an ascendant role in modern
economic analysis of tort law involves the concepts of 'tvealth
maximization" and "efficiency," and the relationship befmeen them.
Michael D. Green describes the 'tvealth maximization"-ueconomic
efficiency" relationship in these terms: "By economic efficiency [is
meant] maximizing total societal resources, without concern for the
distribution of those resources among members of ~ o c i e t y . ~
With no presumption of stating more than the sparest outline of
the efficiency approach t o accident liability law, one of its most
noteworthy constructs has been to "emphasize [tort lam's] role in
substituting for efficient contractual exchange.*
To illustrate
this approach, Posner has enlisted the law of battery-the commond or offensive touching.
law rule concerning liability for h
Quite apart from the corrective justice, moral and fairness attributes of tort liability for battery, the law and economics argument
states that the doctrine should "dete[r] persons from engaging in
activities that a reasonable person would view ahead of time to be
socially wasteful."94
Posner illustrates with the decision in Garratt v. Dailey;'
remembered as the case in which the nearly six-year-old Dailey

the legislation will bring greater predictability to this area of the low, and,
thus,save time and money for manufacturers, product sellers and consumers
alike, each of whom will be able to determine their rights mom readily thnn
under current law. The legislation should also foster product innovation and
enhance the competitive position of U. S. product mnnufacturers in viorld
markets.
PRIVACY

S. 648 will have no adverse impact on the personal privacy of the
individuals or businesses affected.
PAPERWORK
S. 648 creates no new regulations and imposes no additional regulatory
reguirements a t either state or the federal level. The legislation \rill not
change the jurisdiction of state or federal courts.
S. REP.NO. 10532, a t 24-25 (1997).
92 Michael D. Green, Negligence =Economic Efficiency: Doubts >, 75 TEX. L
.REV. 1605,
1607 11-12 (1997) (citing Richard A. Posner, Wealth Aiaximization and Judicial DccisionMaking, 4
REV. L. & ECON.131,132 (1984)).
93 COLE~~AN,
supra note 30, a t 197.
%JAMES A. HENDERSON, JRET L,THE TORTS PROCESS 29-30 (4th ed. 1994)(discussing
RICHARD A. POSNER,ECONOMC
ANALYSIS OF b W 206-11 (4th ed 1992)).
95 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955).
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pulled away the lawn chair as his, until that point, affectionate
aunt was in the process of sitting down?6 Tort liability in battery
would serve the efficiency objective, its proponent would argue,
irrespective of whether Dailey received any psychological or
material benefit from the act. If the harm to the aunt exceeded any
benefits to Dailey, a simple utilitarian analysis would support
imposition of liability. If, on the other hand, Dailey derived
benefits that exceeded any physical or emotional injury to his aunt,
pulling out the chair was wasteful or inefficient. Why wasteful?
Because the transaction (the act and the harm) without the aunt's
consent could, and probably did, generate substantial accident
costs, not the least of such costs being a sizeable litigation process." In Posner's words, such torts:
involve . . .a coerced transfer of wealth to the defendant
occurring in a setting of low transaction costs. Such
conduct is inefficient because it violates the principle
. . .that where market transaction costs are low, people
should be required to use the market if they can and to
9 98
desist from the conduct if they cant.
Posner concludes that such bypassing of the market is inefficient
and therefore should create liability in tort?' Transferred to a
products liability context, what of the seller of a defective product
that causes personal physical injury or property damage? Economists might recast the corrective justice goals of encouraging
individual autonomy and liberty to efficiency-based objectives
phrased in terms of discouraging involuntary transfers of wealth,

g6

Id. a t 1092.

'' Studies reveal that the more complex the litigation, the greater proportion tertiary
accident costs bear to aggregate victim compensation. For example, a Rand Institute for
Civil Justice study demonstrated that victims receive 52% of total litigation expenditures in
automobiletort cases; 43% innonautomobile litigation, such as products liability and medical
malpractice claims, and 37% in asbestos cases. DEBORAH
R. HENSLERET U.,TRENDS IN
TORT LITIGATION: THE STORYBEHINDTHE STATISPICS 27-28 (19871, discussed in Robert L.
Rabin, Tort Law in Transition: Tracing Pattern of SocioLegal Change, 23 VAL.U . L. REV.
1, 16 (1988). For a definition of primary, secondary and tertiary 'accident costs," seo noto
103, infia.
POSNER,
supra note 94, a t 208.
99 Id. a t 207-09.
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market avoidance,100or imposition of negative e~ternalities.'~'
A product purchaser has a societally-countenanced expectation, the
argument goes, that the product will not create an unreasonable
risk of harm if used for its reasonably foreseeable p ~ r p o s e . ' ~
Should the product prove dangerously defective, and should the
purchaser be injured or his property be damaged, the manufacturer
has, in a sense, subverted the market and created accident
costslo3 that might have been avoided had the manufacturer

lW
See Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Re/4rm A Theoretical Synthesis,
97 YALEL.J. 353, 355 (1988) (supposing consumer sovereignty ns dominant objective in
transactions between contracting parties, under which norm: %e lnvr should reflect the
preferences of competent, informed consumers regarding risk nllocntiona), discussed in
Kathryn D
i
x Sowle, Toward a Synthesis of Product LiabiIiLy Principles: Schuartz's Lfodet
and the Cost-MinimizationAZterMtive, 46 U. hiwin L. REV. 1 , 9 (1991).
lo' Broadly speaking, a tort is a civil (seldom a criminal) vmng. Such n vmng
occurs when one party, usually unintentionally. destroys another party's
initial entitlement by imposing a negative externality on him. The courts can
then provide a remedy in the form of damages. When externalities result in
the forcible taking of initial entitlements-for example, when n slnughterhouse pollutes the air of the surrounding neighborhood-liability rules can
be invoked. Concomitantly government assumes responsibility for the
imposition of objectively determined compensation and its prompt payment
to the party harmed.
WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAWAND ECONO~~CS:
AN I N T R O D U ~ R YANALYSIS127 (1979).
See PRODUCTS LIABILITY REsrATEhBNT, supm note 1, 5 2 Reporters' Note, cmt. a
(=[S]trictliabiity has been justified on fairness grounds because the product containing n.
hidden manufacturing defect that causes harm disappoints the consumer's or user's
reasonable expectations with regard to safety." (citing, inter din, F. Pntricli Hubbard,
Recrsonnble Human Expectations: A Normative Model for Imposing Strict Liability /or
Defective Products, 29 ~ ~ % R C L.
E RREV. 465 (1978); Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational
Theoly of Consumer Protection. Doctrine, Function and Legal Liabitily for Product
Disappointment, 60 V k L. REV. 1109 (1974))).
lC3 See CALABRESI,
COSIS OF ACCIDENTS, supm note 22, a t 35-129 (discussing loss
spreading, general deterrence, and specificdeterrence approaches to accident cost reduction).
Stephen Sugarman has summarized Calabresi's cost-avoidance philosophy:
In The Costs of Accidents, Calabresi argued that society's policy towords
accidents should be to minimize the sum of primary, secondnry, m d tertinry
accident costs. Reducing primary costs concerns promoting snfety (while not
discouraging, if possible, socially desirable innovation). Reducing secondary
costs concerns spreading the costs of compensation pnid to nccident victims.
Tertiary costs are the transactions costs; these costs include the costs of
lawyers' fees, insurance administration, the parties' time, and court costs.
Stephen D. Sugarman, A Restatement of Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1163,1167 (1992) (review
essay).
Jules Coleman further explains the three types of costs attributable to personal injury or
property damage torts:
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simply bargained for pertinent product-related rights.
What rights might have been bargained for? It has been
suggested that actual bargaining regarding the cost a product user
might assign to, for example, loss of vision in one eye due to a
defect in protective eyewear, would engender problems in arriving
at a valuation. Moreover, the reliability of such a valuation, even
if it could be agreed to preliminarily, might make an actual
contractual objective infeasible.lo4
Perhaps the best substitute for an actual-bargained-for exchange
is a circumstance in which a buyer fully apprised of pertinent
safety-related information and instructions for the safe operation
of a product makes an informed decision to purchase the product
for the buyer's use or for devotion t o the use of others. Bearing in
mind the precedent establishing that a warning, however effective,
cannot vitiate a manufacturer's liability for injury or damage
caused by a defectively designed product,lo5such a knowledgable
consent or choice model for sale of a product with a high risk level
means, in a proto-contractual sense, that the seller has bargained
for the right to sell it. In essence, the seller preserves the transaction within the market by conveying warnings sufficient to permit
Primary costs are the dollar equivalent of the damages caused by accidents.
Secondary costs are the costs of bearing the costs of accidents. These are tho
costs associated with the various schemes for distributing the primary (and
tertiary) costs of accidents. Secondary costs are reduced when they are
spread maximally over persons and time, or when they are borne by those
individuals in the best position to bear them. Tertiary costs are the
administrative costs of any system, including the tort system, for determining
v~hoshould bear the costs of accidents.
COLEMAN,
supra note 30, a t 204.
lW
Calabresi and Melamed describe the difficulty of actually bargaining for productrelated rights:
If we were to give victims a property entitlement not to be accidentally
injured we would have to require all who engage in activities that may injure
individuals to negotiate with them before an accident, and to buy the right
to knock off an arm or a leg. Such pre-accident negotiations would be
extremely expensive, oRen prohibitively so
And, after an accident, the
loser of the arm or leg can always very plausibly deny that he would have
sold it at the price the buyer would have offered.
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1108-09 (19721, discussed in HIRSCH,
supra note 101, a t 166.
See generally 1M. STUARTMADDEN,P R O D ULIABIL~TY
~
$8.5 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp.
1995, with Kathy Seward Northern) (collecting authority).

....
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the purchasers to make informed choices whether or not to expose
themselves to the risk.lo6 Absent a bargain struck with an
informed purchaser, the sale of a product defective for want of
adequate warnings, and that proximately causes plaintiffs harm,
represents an involuntary or coerced transfer of wealth from the
injured party t o the injurer.
As the above discussion illustrates, valuation problems cannot
always be avoided via the warning mechanism; therefore, under an
economic efficiency tort theory, some method must be employed to
make such determinations. A primitive but greatly persuasive
valuative standard was offered in a negligence context by Judge
Learned Hand in the opinions in United States v. Carroll Towing
Co.,lo7 and Conway v. 0'Brien.'08 In those two cases, the Second Circuit held that the degree of care appropriate to a given
action or omission to act should be the result of a three-factor
calculus: (1)the likelihood that the conduct will injure others, (2)
multiplied by the seriousness of the risk if it happens, (3) balanced
against the burden of taking precautions against the risk.lm In
formula, the calculation is known as B (Burden) < P (Probability of
Harm)X L (Magnitude of Loss Should It Occur)."O The Learned
Hand approach can be conformed to a more modern utilitarian
analysis by visualizing B, or the Burden upon the actor, as
encompassing not only the particular burden of precautionary
measures upon the actor, but also the burden upon society if the
conduct must either be eliminated due to liability rules, or made
more expensive if the precautionary measures are undertaken."'
lo6See
i n b notes 149-166 and accompanyingtext (discussing present m d proposed tort
standards for warnin= and ~oliciesbehind those standards).
lW 159 F.2d 169, i73 (2dkir. 1947) (involving suit against barge m d tugboat opentors
for barge's sinking).
las 1
11F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) (involving automobiic accident on nval Vermont
road), rev'd on other grounds,312 U.S.492 (1941).
log Id.; see also 1MADDEN,s u p m note 105, a t 108 (explainingformulntion of three factors
by Judge Hand).
"O POSNER,
supm note 94, a t 164.
"
'
Likewise, in keeping with a utilitarian economicview that trnnscends the concerns of
the individual plaintiff and defendant, consideration of the factors P (Probability of H m )
and the L (Magnitude of the Loss should it occur) would be enlarged to contemplate the
likelihood of harm to others identically or similarly situated, and the mngnitude of the
potential harm, not only in terms of the individual plaintiff but nlso to the population
exposed to the risk
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Posner machined the Hand formulation into an efficiency
principle by explaining that:
Hand was adumbrating, perhaps unwittingly, an
economic meaning of negligence. Discounting (multiplying) the cost of an accident if it occurs by the probability
of occurrence yields a measure of the economic benefit
to be anticipated from incurring the costs necessary to
prevent the accident. . . . If the cost of safety measures
[including, perhaps, "eliminating the activity"] or of
curtailment-whichever cost is lower--exceeds the
benefit in accident avoidance to be gained by incurring
that cost, society would be better off, in economic terms,
to forgo accident prevention.l12
What does the efficiency approach add to the far older utilitarian
approach?'13 Posner partially harmonized wealth maximization

Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1J. LEGALSTUD.
29,32 (1972). Posnor
continues:
When the cost of accidents is less than the cost of prevention, a rational
profit-maximking enterprise will pay tort judgments
rather than incur
the larger cost of avoiding liability. Furthermore, overall economic value or
welfare would be diminished rather than increased by incurring a higher
accident-prevention cost in order to avoid a lower accident cost.
Perhaps, then, the dominant function of the fault system is to generate
rules of liability that if followed will bring about, at least approximately, the
efficientthe cost-justified-level of accidents and safety.
Because wo do
not like to see resources squandered, a judgment of negligence has inescapable overtones of moral disapproval, for it implies that there was a cheaper
alternative to the accident. . . Where, [alternatively,] the measures
necessary to avert the accident would have consumed excessive resources,
there is no occasion to condemn the defendant for not having taken them.
Id. a t 33.
It should be noted that some scholars have speculated about the usefulness, in practice,
of the BcPL approach. Mark Grady asks whether Posner, and Posner with Landes, ubolievo
that judges actually refer to economic analysis, or rather that they behave as if they do?"
GRADY,supra note 26, a t 354 n.1 (citing W
~ M. m
IE
s & RICHARDA. POSNER,
THE
ECONOhfIC SmUCruRE OF TORTLAW 85-88 (1987) bereinafter LANDES & POSNER,ECONO~IIC
STRUC~~RE]).
Grady continues: "Did Judge Hand behave as if he knew what thickness of
barge planks combined with what quantity of whiskey maximizes social wealth?" Id. at 356
n.2.
l* See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (describing utilitarian approach). See
generally James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV, L. REV. 97 (1908) (discussing
utilitarian nature of old common law which sacrificed individual needs in order to mcot
reasonable needs of community).

. ..
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.. .

.

Heinonline - - 32 Ga. L. Rev. 1 0 4 6 1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8

19981

CORRECTNE JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY

1047

with utilitarianism, writing: "mhe economist, when speaking
normatively, tends to define the good, the right, or the just as the
maximization of 'welfare' in a sense indistinguishable from the
utilitarian's concept of utility or happine~s.""~ Stephen G. Gilles
adds that Posner's "wealth maximization" approach, interpreted as
requiring a "willingness to pay," might "adopt the same strategy"
as a "casual utilitarianism" analysis."'
To Gilles, "[iln the
context of negligence cases, . .differences between the utilitarian
and wealth-maximization approaches to cost-benefit analysis seem
to disappear once the decision to employ the reasonable person as
a heuristic is made."116
A leading exponent of the efficiency role of the common law of
tort has been Guido Calabresi, who has argued persuasively that
in matters of compensation for accidents, civil liability should
ordinarily be laid at the door of the "cheapest cost avoider," the
actor who could most easily discover and inexpensively remediate
the hazard. Together with A. Douglas Melamed, and employing the
setting of environmental harm, Calabresi asserts that considerations of economic efficiency dictate placing the costs of accidents
"on the party or activity which can most cheaply avoid them."117

.

1' Richard A. Posner, Utilitdmism, Economics. and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGALSTUD.
103,119 (1979), discussed in Steven P. Croley &Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of
Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damuges in Tort Inw, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1787,1824 n.121
(1995). Posner continues: B u t for my normative purposes I want to define the mnximnnd
more narrowly, as 'value' in the economic sense of the term or, more clearly I think, as
'wealth'" Id
Michael D. Green observes wryly: aAccording to Posner, tort law is m d hns been
constructed since the late nineteenth century primarily so as to further economic effiaencyP
Green, supm note 92, at 1607 11.2.
Steven G. Gies, The Invisible Hand Formda, 80 V k L. REV. 1015, 1029 (1994)
(citations omitted).
Id. a t 103637.
'I7 Calabresi & bfelamed, supm note 104, a t 1096-91; see also hLwi C. RAHDEKT.
COVERINGACCIDENT
COSIS: ~~suRANcE,LIABILITY, AND TORTREFORM29, 32-33 (1995)
(analyzing rationale for insurance and addressing concern that cost-spreading function will
divert compensatory responsibility away from least cost avoider).
One frequently-referencedvalidation of the Yeast cost avoider" cnn be found in Union Oil
Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974), a California coastal oil spill cnse in vhich the
court allowed commercial fishermen to recover from defendant their business losses caused
by lost fishing opportunity during a period of pollution. The court found justice and
efficiencywere served by placing responsibility for the loss on the "best cost avoider" Ci this
setting the defendant oil company), reasoning:
[Tlhe loss should be allocated to that party who can best correct m y error in

Heinonline - - 32 Ga. L. Rev. 1 0 4 7 1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8

1048

GEORGLA LAW REVIEW

Pol. 32:1017

Posner's harmonious observation has been that in the so-called
alternative care indemnity damage shifting scenario, 'fve do not
want both tortfeasors to take precautions; we want the lower cost
accident avoider to do so.n118
From another, yet still efficiency-influenced perspective, a
products liability doctrine that passes efficiency muster probably
would result also in a Pareto superior or even a Pareto optimal
resolution.11g A rule is Pareto optimal when its effects benefit all

allocation, if such there be, by acquiring the activity to which the party has
been made liable. . The capacity "to buy out" the plaintiffs if tho burden
is too great is, in essence, the real focus of Calabresi's approach. On this
basis there is no contestthe defendants' capacity is superior.
Id. at 570 (citing CALABRESI,
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 22, at 150-52).
Calabresi and Hirschoff provide a concise description of what the least cost avoidor
approach requires, both of private parties and of the government:
The strict liability test we suggest does not require that a government
only n decision
institution make . ..a cost-benefit analysis. It requires
as to which of the parties to the accident is in the best position to make a
cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and
to a d on the decision once it is made. The question for the court reduces to
a search for the cheapest cost avoider.
Calabresi & Hirschoff, Strict Liability, supm note 22, at 1060.
POSNER,supra note 94,s 6.8.
In some settings defendants themselves have sought to employ the cheapest cost nvoidor
rationale to promote a finding of no liability when a consumer aware of product risks is, tho
argument goes, the party that can most cheaply avoid the accident costs. See Dowey v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 k 2 d 1239,1254(N.J.1990)(discussingdefendant's argumont that
cigarette consumers are cheapest cost avoiders).
'I9 The Pareto criteria for wealth maximization analysis are summarized in DAVIDW.
BARNES& LYNN k A TOUT, THE ECONOhIIC ANALYSISOF TORTLAW 11(1992):
A classification scheme designed by Vilfredo Pareto in the early 1900's
provides one solution to [utility and wealth maximization analysis] and also
to the analytical difficulties presented by the impossibility of intorporsonal
utility comparisons. . . The first application of the Pareto criteria is to
evaluate the desirability of changes in the distribution of goods. Pareto's
system allows that evaluation without regard to the desirability of the initial
distribution among individuals of either their abilities to pay or enjoy and
without the need for interpersonal utility comparisons. Imagine a socioty in
which all resources have already been allocated to particular individuals.
Now imagine a change in allocations that left at least one person bettor off
and no one worse off. Surely that change is desirable from any perspective.
Economists refer to such a change in the allocation of resources as a Pareto
superior change.

..

.. .

.

Heinonline - - 32 Ga. L. Rev. 1 0 4 8 1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8

19981

CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY

1049

parties, in essence, a win-win p r o p o s i t i ~ n .As
~ ~ summarized by
Mark Seidenfeld:

An economic change is considered a Pareto improvement
[or Pareto superior] if it makes some individuals better
off without making any person worse off. A state of the
economic system is Pareto optimal (or Pareto Efficient)
if there is no Pareto superior state that society can
reach. If we are using the Pareto criterion to evaluate
our economic system, we say that a Pareto optimal state
is "economically efficient.nlZ1
A sketch of potential Pareto optimal application to a seller's
warning duties and potential liability can be found in a scenario in
which an adequate warning accompanies a prescription pharmaceutical, providing sufficient information concerning risks and benefits
t o the health care professional. The health profession benefits by
being able to most reliably and effectively prescribe pharmaceuticals to an appropriate class of patients with a risk that is not
disproportionate to the therapeutic reward^.^ Individual patients within the class for whom the pharmaceutical is prescribed
benefit therapeutically, and pharmaceutical companies benefit by
avoiding the miring inefficiencies and tertiary accident costs of
protracted civil litigation and regulatory problems associated mith
well-grounded civil or regulatory claims'of failure to provide
adequate warnings.

Id. at 12.
[Tlhe Pareto principle. ..is that a change Cicluding a change brought a b u t
by an accident or a n intentional act) is good if it makes a t lenst one person
better off and no one worse off. This is a liberal" principle nkin to KnnVs
and hWs principle that everyone is entitled to as much liberty as b
consistent mith the liberty of all other people.
Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philasophical Inquiry. i n
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF TORT
LAW.supm note 44. a t 99.104 (citation omitted).
MARKSEmmmm, ~ ~ I C R O E CPREDICATES
ONO~~C
TO LAW
AND ECOXOL~LICS
49 (1996).
For a general description of Pareto optimality principles, see RBBW PAUL
hWLOY. U P 1 AND
Eco~omcs:A COMPARATIVE APPROACHTO m O R Y AND PRACl'ICE (1990).
=See PRODUCIS
LIABILITY
RESTATEAENT,
supm note 1.5 6 ("Liabiity of Seller or Other
Distributor for Harm Caused by Defective Prescription Drugs and h l e d i d Devices?.
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D. LIMITED EXPLICIT JUDICIAL ADOFTION OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE OR
EFFICIENCY IDEALS

Referencing a 1991American Law Institute Reporters'
Steven D. Sugarman noted tartly that "one of the last places to find
lucid thinking about the desirable direction of tort law is in the
published opinions of state and federal judges.
While his
complaint surely represents hyperbole for effect, Sugarman is
correct in observing that discussion of tort principles in the
decisional law is frequently colloquial, with courts often doing no
more than lumping together as coextensive such objectives as
expeditious claims resolution, reduced transaction costs, and
effi~iency.~~
Congressional discussion and fact-finding, in turn,
frequently have been more polemic than inf0rmati~e.l~~
Explicit judicial adoption of the tenets of either corrective justice
or law and economics has been sporadic, and even where mentioned
in decided cases, either the expression or the application of the two
theories is often inexact. An example of a judge's misinterpretation
of doctrine is the peevish dissent of Judge Doggett in k n s p o r t a tion Insurance Co. v. Morie1,12' where a punitive damages award
was reversed in a suit by an injured worker against the workers'
compensation carrier, alleging bad faith delay. Referencing the
majority's caution regarding "overdeterrence," Judge Doggett wrote:
"Perhaps the majority subscribes t o that perspective which
maintains that compensatory tort laws should not prevent wrongfully caused injuries, but rather encourage misconduct to the extent
that its economic benefit outweighs its cost.n128

lP &ERICA. LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS'STUDY: ENTERPRISE
RESPONSIDILITY FOR
PERSONAL
T N ~ (1991)
Y
bereinafter REPORTERS' STUDY].
lU Sugarman, supra note 103, at 1165.
In Posner's words: "Lawyers are not only quick but unashamed to make emphatic
assertions on matters of fad .. without attempting, desiring, or even being willing to
supra note 36, at 70, discussed in
subject those assertions to an empirical test." POSNER,
Philip Shuchman, It Isn't That the Tort Lawyers Are So Right, It's Just That the Tort
Reformers Are So Wrong,49 RUTGERSL. REV. 485,512 n.136 (1997).
'2GSee,e.g., supra note 91 (quoting discussion in accompanying Senate Report on effects
of Reform Act).
In 879 S.W.2d 10, 38 (Tex. 1994) (Doggett, J., dissenting).
'21 Id. (Doggett, J., dissenting) (citing RICHARD
A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC
ANALYSISOF LAW,
147-52, 176-77, 191-95 (3d ed. 1986)).

.
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Other courts, however, have consciously elevated their jurisdiction's awareness of economic concepts in fashioning tort law.
Illustrative is the Third Circuit's decision in Whitehead v. St. Joe
Lead CO.,~'~
a lead poisoning case in which defendants included
suppliers of lead to plainws industrial employer. Reversing
summary judgment for defendants,130the court observed:

"mt may well be that suppliers, acting individually or
through their trade associations, are the most efficient
cost avoiders." Certainly it could be found to be inefficient for many thousands of lead processors to individually duplicate the industrial hygiene research, design,
and printing costs of a smaller number of lead suppliers.131
To like effect is the decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court in
Schneider National, Inc. v. Holland Hitch C O . ' ~There
~
the court
explicitly relied upon Posner's "alternative care joint tortfeasor"
evaluation to reach the conclusion that indemnity should not be
available "where both actors have a Soint care' obligation to avoid
the injury.
The court noted, however, that when the actors'
culpability varied, i.e., they were not in pari delicto, the higher
relative fault of one defendant, the "lower cost avoider," would vest
indemnity rights in the other tortfeasor.13'
729 F.2d 238 (3d Cr.1984).
I d a t 256.
"'Id a t 247 (citing, inter alia, Calabresi & Hirschoff, Strict Liability,supm note 22, a t
1060-61);see also Beauchamp v. Russell, 547 F. Supp. 1191,1197 n.6 (N.D. Ga. 19829(ating
with approval proposition that "in apportioning liability behvecn a pnrtrnaker and an
assembler, the cheapest cost avoider should bear 111liability" (citation omitted)).
'
3
2 843 P.2d 561 (nTYo. 1992).
'= Id. a t 575 (citations omitted). The court also noted enthusiastidly thnt Posner's
reformulation and expansion of the Learned Hand negligence (nctunlly brench of duty)
formula in United States v. Camll Towing Co.. 159 F.2d 169. 173 (2d Cir. 19471,
"demonstrates a rationale for tort law policy choices wvhich is precise and persuasive? Id.
at 572 a10; see also supm notes 107-111and accompanying text (describing Hnnd formula).
Schneider Nat'l, 843 P.2d a t 575 (citing LANDES & POSNER,Ecolc'osnc STRUCTURE,
supra note 112, a t 206); see also Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Vlyo. 1986).
There, the court stated:
When a defective article enters the stream of commerce and an innocent
person is hurt, it is better that the loss fall on the manufncturcr, distributor
or seller than on the innocent victim. ... They are simply in the best

"
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In the insurance declaratory judgment context, the dissenting
opinion in Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, I ~ c . ,proposed
' ~ ~ a "discoverability" rule for triggering
insurance carrier coverage of asbestos claims, asserting that this
approach would, relying upon a least cost avoider rationale, provide
incentives within the insured-insurer relationship that could hold
the promise of reducing accident costs.'36 Specifically, the dissent
reasoned that:

[tlbe more "early" insurers that are liable upon a
victim's exposure, the more likely it is that the potential
harm will be discovered and the public warned. If an
insurer sees that the product poses some risks, he may
raise premiums accordingly. This may ultimately cause
the manufacturer to remove the product from the
market or to give better warnings in order to lower
insurance premiums. This in turn reduces accident
Whichever gloss is placed upon economic analysis-its deterrent
effect, or its ability to reduce accident costs-its concepts can be
understood "even at the rudimentary level of jurists," at least
according to Judge Patrick Higgenb~tham.'~~
In Louisiana ex rel.
Guste v. M\V Testbank,13' a renowned vessel collision case
involving claims for economic loss not accompanied by physical

position to either insure against the loss or spread the loss among all
consumers of the product.
Ogle, 716 P.2d at 342.
Ogle was later described by the Wyoming Supreme Court as an indication of how strict
liability "introduced economic analysis to tort law." Schneider Nat'l, 843 P.2d at 680. Tho
Schneider Nat'l court proceeded to analogize Ogle's "risk allocationn theory to a *cheapest
cost avoider" approach. Id. (citing LANDES & POSNER,ECONO~~IC
STRU(;TORE, supra noto
112, at 5484); Gilles, supm note 115, a t 1306; see also FVilson v. Good Humor Corp., 767
F.2d 1293, 1306 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (identifying but not pursuing cheapest cost avoidor
analysis in action brought by parents of child fatally iqjured while crossing street to moot
ice cream vending truck).
135 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
13"d. at 1230-32 (Memtt, J., dissenting).
ln Id. a t 1231-32 (Memitt, J., dissenting).
Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M N Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th Cir. 1985).
Id.
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damage t o a proprietary interest, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, per Judge Higgenbotham, justified its rehsal to permit
such recovery (and gave support to the court;'scontinued adherence
t o the economic loss doctrine of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v.
Flint),'* in part upon its reasoning that permitting liability for
the "unknowable" amounts that might be posed as economic loss
claims arising fkom any substantial mishap mould erode the
efficient deterrent effect of such a tort rule, as a rational, wealthmaximizing actor mould be unable to guage the optimal precautionary measures for avoidance of a predictable accident cost.141
Even without explicit recognition of economic, utilitarian or
correctivejustice concerns, influential decisions have adopted and
promoted such precepts, sometimes distending these established
tort principles into ungainly hybrids. In the setting of environmental harm, notions of corrective justice and utilitarianism have
coexisted uneasily for decades. Originally, even the most economically powerless landholder could seek and secure an injunction
against a neighboring activity that interfered substantially with the
plaintifPs use of property. Numerous early decisions evidenced a
judicial unwillingness to "balance" injuries, i.e., to weigh the
defendant's cost and the communityhardship in losing the indusfxy
against the often modest provable harm to plaintiffs ordinarily
small and noncommercial property. As the New York Court of

"275 U.S. 303,309 (1927);see People Express Airlines, Inc v. Consolidated Rnil Corp.,
495 k 2 d 107,109 (N.J. 1985)('[A] virtually per se rule barring recovery for mnomic loss
unless the negligent conduct also caused physical harm has evolved throughout this century
m

--..I.

In Higgenbotham's words:
That the [economic loss] rule is identifiable and will predict outcomes in
advance of the ultimate decision about recovery enables it to plny ndditionnl
roles. Here we agree with plaintiffs that economic analysis, even at tho
rudimentary level ofjurists, is helpful both in the identificntion of such roles
and the essaying of how the roles play. Thus it is suggested thnt plncing d
the consequence of its error on the maritime industry rdl enhance its
incentive for safety. While correct, as far as such analysis goes, such in
terrorem benefits have an optimal level. Presumably, when the cost of M
unsafe condition exceeds its utility there is an incentive to chnnge. A s tho
costs of an accident become increasing multiples of its utility, however, there
is a point at which greater accident costs lose meaning, and the inccntivo
curve flattens. When the accident costs are added in lorge but unbaorrable
amounts the value of the exercise is diminished.
Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1029.
14'
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Appeals stated in Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper CO.,'~~
not
granting the small landowner an injunction solely because the loss
to him, in absolute terms, was less than would be the investmentbacked loss to the nuisance-creating business and lost employment
within the community, would "deprive the poor litigant of his little
property by giving it to those already rich.n143
In contrast, the modern rule governing injunctions, including
environmental injunctions, might seem coldly utilitarian. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 936 lists factors for injunction
issuance which expressly include weighing of 'the nature of the
interest to be protected,"144thus presumably inviting an elevation
of plaintiffs bona fides where the court considers the activity
meritorious (perhaps a Camp Fire Girls campground) and a
devaluation where the court deems it less valuable (perhaps an
automobile scrapyard). Along similar lines, hardship t o the
defendant of ceasing or changing its activity, and "the interests of
third persons and of the publicn are proper consideration^.'^^
Representative of such an approach is the result reached in
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement CO.,'~~
which involved a large scale
and conceded industrial nuisance in the form of airborne cement
dust emanating from an upstate New York cement plant. In the
lower court, a nuisance was found, and temporary damages
awarded, but plaintiffs' application for an injunction was denied.147 Recognizing that to deny the injunction would depart
from Whalen's corrective justice, no balancing approach discussed
above, the court nevertheless adopted a utilitarian approach that
weighed the hardships imposed upon plaintiffs against the
economic consequences of the requested injunction. The court
explained: "The ground for denial of injunction, notwithstanding

'" 101 N.E. 805 (N.Y. 1913).
'"Id. at 806. By "giving it," the court of course meant by requiring plaintiff to onduro
ongoing environmental servitudes imposed by defendant. Id. The court in McCleery o.
Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 140 F. 951 (C.C.D. Utah 19041, reached a comparablo
corrective justice conclusion and granted the injunction against the defendant's mino and
smelter. The court held, however, that because complainants delayed in npplying for cm
injunction, it would only be granted if defendants refused to pay damages. Id. at 955.
lU RESTATE~TENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS§ 936(1)(a) (1979).
Id. 9 936(l)(e)-(g).
257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y.1970).
14' Id. at 871-72.

'"
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the finding both that there is a nuisance and that plaintiffs have
been damaged substantially, is the large disparity in economic
consequences of the nuisance and of the injunction.nl48
111. EVALUATION
OF REPRESENTATIVE
PROPOSALS
THROUGH
THE HEXJ'RISTIC DEVICEOF CORRECTIVEJUSTICE-MORALITY
AND EFFICIENCY-DETERRENCE
A. WARNINGS

1. Generally. Independently of a manufacturer's design or
manufacturing processes, the seller may be found liable in products
liability if the product lacks adequate warnings regarding a
genuine risk of harm or, where appropriate, instructions as to how
to use the product without an unreasonable risk of harm.14g
These two informational obligations, i.e., to provide both (1)

'"Id. a t 872. Legitimate questions may be raised about the m c h of Boomer. A
competing conclusion was reached in Little Joseph Realty, Inc v. Toun of Babylon. 363
N.E.2d 1163,1167-69 (N.Y. 1977), in which the same New York Court of Appeals issued an
injunction against an asphalt plant operating contrary to zoning ordinances, and distinguished Boomer as a case involving %o zoning violation, or for thnt mntter, [no] violntion of
any other statute."
As the Reporters to the Products Liability Restatement explained:
[c]ommercial products sellers must provide reasonable instructions and
warnings about risks of injury associated with their products. Instructions
inform persons how to use and consume products safely. Wnmings d e r t
users and consumers to the existence and nature of product risks so that they
can prevent harm either by appropriate conduct during use or consumption
or by choosing not to use or consume.
B
PRODUCTS
LJABILITYRE~~ATEMENT,
supm note
2 cmt. i; see, eg.,A s k Indus. v. Sunrer,
921 S.W-2d 794, 799-800 CTex. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that manufacturer of asphalt
materials handling system and its successor had duty to warn two nsphdt plant workers
that supporting part of handleis hopper could become dangerous once worn thin); see also
Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195,197 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding thnt even tvhero properly
designed, product may be in unreasonably dangerous condition if mnnufncturer fails to warn
of latent dangers in products); Ragsdale Bros. v. Magro, 693 S.W.2d 530,536 (Tex. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that liabiity of seller can extend to nondefective product "plnced in the flovr
of commerce without adequate warnings of its dangerous propensities or without ndcqunte
instructions for. ..use"), rev'd on othergrounds, 721 S.W.2d 832 CTeK 1986).
It was only at the turn of the nineteenth century that buyer-seller tmnsnctions recognized
any significant departure from the general rule of caveat emptor. Prior to thnt time, the
dominant rule of law required the purchaser % take care of his o m interests." Bnrnnrd v.
Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383,388-89 (1870).

1,s
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adequate warnings; and (2) appropriate instruction^'^^ derive
from two policy objectives: (1)risk reduction and reduction of
accident costs;151and (2) informed consent.ls2
The widely-followed approach for many years has been t o
evaluate products liability claims, including warnings claims, under
both their functional nomenclature (design, manufacture, or
warnings defects) and their doctrinal category (negligence,warranty, and strict tort liability).153In contrast, the "fhctional" analysis adopted in the Products Liability Restatement promotes
recognition of a claim of a "warningsgs"
defect without regard to
doctrinal application of negligence, warranty, or strict tort liability
principles.lM The Products Liability Restatement does not,
however, change the substantive requirements of warnings
obligations.
Be the approach doctrinal or functional, to be adequate under
any theory of liability, a warning, when necessary, must by its size,
location, and intensity of language or symbol, be calculated to
impress upon a reasonably prudent user of the product the nature
and extent of the hazard inv01ved.l~~
The language used (1)must
be direct and should, where applicable, describe methods of safe
For brevity, the informational obligation of providing adequate warnings and
instructions may be referred to herein solely as the "warning" obligation.
l" See generally M. Stuart Madden, Hazard Signs and Products or Toxic Tort Litigation,
24 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 611 (1996) (discussing empirical research into
effectiveness of hazard signs and how such research should affect legal warning standards).
''See infia notes 160-166and accompanyingtext (discussinginformed consent objective);
see also Marshall S. Shapo,A Social Contract Tort, 75 TM. L. REV. 1835,1839 (1997) (noting
that "the concept of consent. . .bridges tort and contract").
'* 1-DEN, supra note 105,§$10.2-.4 (explainingprocess of analyzing when legal duty
to warn arises under these doctrines).
lMPRODUCTS L I A BRESTATEMENT,
~
supra note 1, 2(c).
'"In House v. Annour ofAmerica, Inc., 886 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), arising from
the death of a law enforcement officer whose bulletproof vest was pierced by an assailant's
bullet, the court held:
Flor a warning to be adequate, it must completely disclose all the risks
involved, as well as the extent of those risks. "A warning must (1) bo
designed so it can reasonably be expected to catch the attention of tho
consumer, (2) be comprehensible and give a fair indication of the specific risks
involved with the product; and (3) be of an intensity justified by tho
magnitude of the risk" The overall adequacy of the warning.. must bo
judged in light of the ordinary knowledge common to members of the law
enforcement community.
Id. a t 551 (citations omitted).

.
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use;156and (2) must be timely and advise of significant hazards
from reasonably foreseeable misuse of the product.ls7
I have selected a subset of warnings issues that illustrate the
Products Liability Restatement's substantial fidelity to the decisional law interpreted by its predecessor, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, and the conformity of these approaches with tort goals of
corrective justice and efficiency. The three selected facets are the
rules pertaining to a manufacturer's discharge of its warning duties
(1)regarding open and obvious dangers; (2) upon sale of the
product t o an informed intermediary; and (3) upon sale of raw
material to a downstream manufacturer. At the conclusion of these
comments, I mill address an area to which the decisional law x4.l
surely give continued focus: warnings regarding risks to children
posed by products intended primarily for use by adults.
Warnings as to product hazards and instructions for reasonably
safe use are established mechanisms of risk reduction, as they
theoretically obligate manufacturers to achieve "optimal levels of
safety.
"Optimal levels of safety," it must be noted, does not

ThiS requirement was described in Stonley Industries v. P/.Af. Burr 6: Co., 784 F.
Supp. 1570 (Fla 1992):
. adequnte vrnrning of o.
The manufacturer must provide users with
produds dangerous propensities. In short, a manufacturer must take
reasonable precautions to avoid reasonably foreseeable injuries to the users
of its products and thereby assumes a duty to convey to the users of thnt
product a fair and adequate warning of the dangerous potcntinlities of the
products so that the user, by the exercise of rensonnble m,v d l have fhir
and adequate notice of the possible consequences of the product's use or
misuse.
Id at 1574 (citations omitted).
Brown v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 667 P.2d 750,758 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). In Brown, a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to the adequacy of wnrnings regding, inter din,
use of a nongrounded extension cord with a power source. Noting thnt "[rr]nrnings nre
instructions as to dangers that might occur if the instructions nre not foUomedP tho court
held that the manufacturer of an electrical extension cord had no duty to rrnm of dnngers
resulting if the cord were cut. I d a t 756.
A comment to the Products Liability Restatement explains:
[Section 21 (b) and (c), which impose liability for products thnt rue defectively
designed or sold without adequate warnings or instructions and nre thus not
reasonably safe, achieve the same general objectives ns does linbiity
predicated on negligence. The emphasis is on crenting incentives for
manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of safety in designing and marketing
products.
PRODUCTS LIABElTY RESTATEhfENT, supm note 1,s 2 cmt.a.

..
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mean total, or even maximum, safety.ls9 The "informed consent"
rationale reflects the societal judgment that a product user or
consumer is entitled to make his own choice as to whether the
product's utility or benefits justify exposing himself to the risk of
harm.160
For example, in T.H.S. Northstar Assocs. v. W.R. Grace &
Co.,l6' a suit brought by a Minneapolis building center for cleanup and abatement, the plaints alleged that Grace's Monokote 3
product contaminated the premises with asbestos. The federal
appeals court affirmed an award of damages, entered by a jury that
had been instructed as to a limited manufacturer's continuing duty
to warn in these words:
[Ilf a manufacturer learns that a previously distributed
product poses a danger to users, it must give additional
warnings or instructions that will enable users to make
informed decisions and use the product safely.
A
manufacturer has no duty to warn, however, if the user
is or should be fully aware of all of the dangers inherent
in the product, but past experience or familiarity with
a product does not necessarily alert a user to all of the
dangers associated with the p r 0 d u ~ t . l ~ ~

...

As suggested in T.H.S. North~tar,'~~
the key to evaluating the
Products Liability Restatement and parallel state statutory and
decisional law regarding warnings and instructions is in identifjring
the primary role of a seller's informational obligation as one of

Comment a clarifies: "Society does not benefit from products that are excessively
safe-for example, automobiles designed with maximum speeds of 20 miles per hour-any
more than it benefits from products that are too risky. Society benefits most when the right,
or optimal, amount of product safety is achieved." Id.
la, See, e.g., Bore1 v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076,1089 (6th Cir. 1973)
("[A] true choice situation arises, and a duty to warn attaches, whenever a reasonable mnn
would want to be informed of the risk in order to decide whether to expose himself to it.");
Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F. Supp. 1483,1498 (D.Kan. 1987) (holding that consumer has
right to know risks so that he can make informed decision).
16' 66 F.3d 173 (8th Cir. 1995).
Id. a t 176.
'"Id. a t 176-77.
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informed consent.164 From the standpoint of corrective justice,
warnings adequate to permit a product user to make an informed
decision as to whether t o expose himself or others to the risk are
central to preservation of a product user's autonomy interests.Ia
From an efficiency perspective, informed decisionmaking by
plaintiff permits the buyer-seller transaction to be fairly characterized as an agreement that avoids the extracontractual inefficiencies
of involuntary wealth transfers.166
Some critics of the Products Liability Restatement's warning
provisions argue that section 2(c) and its commentary abandon
fairness to victims in favor of economic and business expedien~ y A .partial
~ response
~ ~
is that section 2(c) as interpreted by the
Reportersfaithfbllyreflects the law regarding sellers' informational
obligations as that law has developed over the last several dec a d e ~ . *It
~ ~is worth bearing in mind that it has never been the
objective of tort law that every injury have a remedy at law or
equity, but rather that only socially unacceptable injuries (as
perceived by proponents of corrective justice, efficiency, or both) be
remedied.16'
2. Corrective Justice. As a general proposition, a seller mill not
be liable for failing to provide warnings regarding product risks

la See also, e.g., Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., 462 N.W.2d 348, 365
Mch. 1990) (involving litigation arising from injuries suffered by diving into above-ground
swimming pool).
165 Conversely, a risk creator's interest in self autonomy diminishes to the extent thnt he
has " 'already injected himself into the plaintiffs realm! " Andrulonis v. United Stntcs, 724
F. Supp. 1421,1494 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting Shlomo l'werski, Note, AlfSrmatiue Duty Afler
Tarasoff, 11HOF~TRA
L. REV. 1013,1025 (1983). modifid on other grounds, 924 F.2d 1210
(2d Cir. 1990).
See s u p m notes 93-106 and accompanying text (discussing application of effiaency
theory to products liability law as intended, in part, to discourngo involuntruy transfers of
wealth).
lm See generally Mark h1cLaughlin Hager, Don't Say I Didn't Ti'am You EL^ Though I
Didn't): Why the Pro-Defendant Consensus on Warning Law Is Wrong, 61 TEMJ. L REV.
1125,1172 (1994) (arguing that "current doctrine is excessively pro-defendnnt and should be
reformed in a pro-plaintiff direction").
'@Sees u p m notes 3-4 and accompanying text(desaibing objectives and pmcess ofkLI.
in draRing Restutemnts).
Cf: Vernon Palmer, A Geneml Theory of the Inner Structure of Strict Liability:
Common Law, Civil Law, and Compamtiue Law, 62 Rn. L. REV. 1303,1312 11.30 (1988)
(discussingRoman principle of injwicr under v~hichadamage caused in the exorcise of n right
...was free &om liabiity").
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that are generally known or obvious. The rationale for not
requiring warnings in such instances is found in Products Liability
Restatement section 2 comment j, which states: "When a risk is
obvious or generally known, the prospective addressee of a warning
will or should already know of its existence. Warning of an obvious
or generally known risk in most instances will not provide an
effective additional measure of safety.n170
The Products Liability Restatement preservation of this "open and
obviousn rule is supported by the position taken in a majority of
jurisdictions that there exists no duty to warn of obviously
hazardous conditions.17' The approach adopted in the decisions
comprising this body of law is stated by one court in this language:
"A manufacturer cannot manufacture a knife that will not cut or a
hammer that will not mash a thumb or a stove that will not burn
a finger. The law does not require him to warn of such common
dangers.n172
In following this rule, the Reporters made no significant sacrifice
in the correctivejustice goal of risk reduction. The neutrality of the
"open and obviousnrule is demonstrated by the difficulty in arguing
that a person who would knowingly encounter an obvious risk
would become less likely to do so if such risk were accompanied by
a warning. Moreover, there is a social cost to overwarning. As
stated by Henderson and Twerski in a formative analysis:
The most significant social cost generated by requiring
distributors to warn against remote risks is the reduced
effectiveness of potentially helpful warnings directed
"O PRODUCTS
LIABILITYRESTATE~ENT,supra note I,§2 cmt. j. Comment j reasons that
"warnings that deal with obvious or generally known risks may be ignored by usors nnd
consumers and may diminish the significance of warnings about non-obvious, not-genordly-known risks. Thus, requiring warnings of obvious or generally known risks could reduce
the efficacy of warnings generally."
"'See, e.g., Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding no liability
on part of manufacturer of meat grinder in which plaintiffs hand became entnnglod);
Fanning v. LeMay, 230 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1967) (finding no liability on part of mnnufacturor
of shoes the soles of which became slippexy when wet).
'"Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23,26 (D.C. Cir. 1957). In Jamieson, tho
plaintiff had purchased an elastic exerciser that was essentially "an ordinary mbbor ropo,
about the thickness of a large lead pencil, about forty inches long, with loops on the onds."
Id. a t 25. Plaintiff was iqjured when the extended exerciser slipped and stmck hor in tho
eye. Id.
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towards risks which are not remote. Bombarded with
nearly useless warnings about risks that rarely materialize in harm, many consumers could be expected to give
up on warnings a1t0gether.l'~
Accordingly, the Products Liability Restatement rule gives
appropriate recognition to the "human factorsn concern that a
different approach--one commending warnings for obvious
risks-would encourage an environment of overnarning that mould
vitiate the effectiveness of warnings that are genuinely valuable
and appropriate.
As suggested earlier, under both the Restatement (Second) of
Torts and the Products Liability Restatement, a strong informed
consent rationale pervades warnings analysis; a representative
expression of when the duty to warn arises is " fvhenever a
reasonable man would want to be informed of the risk in order to
decide whether to expose himself to it. n174 Thus, a core attribute
of the Reporters' approach is one of vindicating the personal
autonomy interest that underpins corrective justice.
With respect to warning obligations to intermediaries, no
hardship is worked upon corrective justice principles by continuation of the nearly universal rule that a warning only to an intermediary mill satisfy a seller's obligations when, in the totality of the
circumstances, it can be predicted that pertinent safety-related
information mill be effectively conveyed to the end user. In a
scenario often involving risks of personal injury to workplace users
of the product, the Products Liability Restatement preserves the
3

In James A. Henderson, Jr. &Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Cohpse in Products Liability:
The Empty SheU of F d w e to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 296 (1990). The authors
continue:
m h e few persons who might continue to take ~vnmingsseriously in an
environment crowded with warnings of remote risks would probably
overreact, investing too heavily in their versions of "snfety." Given these
limits on the capacity of consumers to react effectively to excessive risk
information, the optimal, rather than the highest, levels of risk infonnntion,
measured both qualitatively and quantitatively, are what is d e d for.
Id at 296-97.
Moran v. Johns-ManvilleSales Corp., 691 F.2d 811,814 (6th Cu.1982)(quoting Borel
v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076,1089 (5th Cu. 1973)); see also Borel, 493
F.2d at 1090 ("A product must not be made available to the public without disclosum of the
dangers that the application of reasonable foresight would reveal.").
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conventional rule regarding a seller's informational obligation to
remote users. In the Reporters' words:
The standard is one of reasonableness in the circumstances. Among the factors to be considered are the
gravity of the risks posed by the product, the likelihood
that the intermediary will convey the information to the
ultimate user, and the feasibility and effectiveness of
giving a warning directly to the user.17=
This approach is in no material way unlike that suggested by the
earlier Restatement (Second) of Torts, comment n,176 and it is
consistent with the protocol described in the leading case law.17'
A like conclusion can be reached in claims arising from use of, or
contact with, raw materials. In terms of corrective justice, the
sellers of raw materials, many of which are transformed into a
seemingly limitless array of applications by downstream participants in the commercial chain, have not, in any meaningful way,
caused a plaintiffs harm. As a plaintiff may pursue a remedy
against the distributive participant who did work the allegedly
h a n d 3 change or modification in the material that triggered a
warning obligation, the principles of corrective justice likewise are
preserved.
3. Eficiency-Deterrence. In the main, the Products Liability
Restatement's treatment of warnings can be harmonized readily
with both Posner's market efficiency and Calabresi's least cost
avoider approa~hes.'~~By declining to take a position that
suggests that a warning should be given even where the risk and

1,s

PRODUCTSLIABILITYRESTATE~~ENT,
supra note
2 cmt. i.
See RESTATE~~ENT
(SECONI))OF TORTS 5 388 cmt, n (1979) (setting forth in far moro
particularized fashion approach recharadenzed in comment i of Products Liability
Restatement).
ln A leading case on this point is Dougherty v. Hooker Chemical Corp., 540 F.2d 174 (3d
Cir. 1976). Dougherty states:
[Lliability arises when the seller, having reason to know that its product is
likely to be dangerous for its intended use, and having no reason to believe
that the intended user will realize its dangerous condition, nevertheless fails
to exercise reasonable care to inform the user of the dangerous condition.
Id. at 177.
'71 See supm notes 92-118 and accompanying text for a discussion of these views.
'71
'71
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the means of its avoidance are abundantly clear, the Reporters
avoid adding unnecessary precautionary costs to the marketing of
products of utility. The Reporters to the Products Liability
Restatement observe that:
[flrom a fairness perspective, requiring individual users
and consumers to bear appropriate responsibility for
proper product use prevents careless users and consumers from being subsidized by more careful users and
consumers, when the former are paid damages out of
funds to which the latter are forced to contribute
through higher product price^."^
While phrased in terms of fairness, this assertion speaks with
equal persuasiveness in terms of efficiency.lEO
Regarding the Products Liability Restatement's approach to
warnings to intermediaries and with respect to ram materials, the
influence of efficiency considerations is even more apparent. In
confirming that the objective of Products Liability Restatement
section 2(c) comment i is indistinguishable from that of Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 388 comment n,lE1the Reporters emphasize the Products Liability Restatement's goal of lowering accident

PRODUCTS L I A B m RFSTATE~ENT,s u p m note 1,§ 2 cmt. a
But see Howard A. Latin, Behavwml Criticisms of the Restatement Vhird) of Torts:
Products Liability, 16 J. PROD. & TOMCS LIAB. 209 (1994). Latin nryes:
m e Reporters suggest] that courts should avoid requiring warning nbout
"obvious product" risks. However, courts often disagree about \~hich
particular product hazards are obvious, and the Reporters offer no guidance
on just how obvious a risk must be before courts should hold as n mntter of
law that warnings need not mention the risk. A h a d obvious to 80 pertent
of product users would not be evident to the other 20 percent, and the costs
of providing a more complete warning to this minority group may be justified
in comparison with the accident losses that could be prevented. Once it is
acknowledged that human cognitive capacities and receptivity to new
information vary widely, which is amply demonstrated by the sodal science
evidence, there is no reason to assume that a riskSbviousmto many product
users will be equally "obvious" to others.
Id. a t 216. Latin sets forth considerable social science evidence supporting this assertion in
Howard A. Latin, "Good" Warnings,Bad Products,and Cognitive Limitatwm, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1193 (1994).
la' Comment i of section 2(c) of the Products Liubility Resfatement ond comment n of
section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts both pertain to wnrnings duties to third
persons.
Heinonline - -
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costs by recognizing that it is ordinarily the workplace supervisor
who can most efficiently and effectively communicate risk information, particularly in settings involving bulk sales of potentially
hazardous materials.ls2 Thus, the Products Liability Restatement
promotes an efficient rule that would relieve the component or
ingredient supplier of liability when the component or ingredient
is not itself defective. In such circumstances, the component or
ingredient supplier ordinarily has no meaningful control over the
hazard level, if any, of the finished product.1s3 As between the
ingredient supplier and the downstream assembler or formulator,
the propel: conclusion is that the downstream formulator, with its
superior (and often exclusive) knowledge of the product's end use,
and which is responsible for ultimate design, formulation, packaging, risk information and marketing, should remain the principal
locus of potential liability.la4
Illuminating in this regard is Shell Oil Co. v. Harri~on,'~'a
suit brought against the manufacturer of the chemical DBCP,
which was sold to a formulator who used it as an ingredient of a

18'See PRODUCTS
LIABILITYRESTATEMENT,
supm note 1,§ 2(c) Reporters' Note, cmt. i, No.
5 (explainingrationale behind rule and noting comment i's relationship to comment n of tho
Restatement (Second) of Torts). See generally M. Stuart Madden, Liability of Suppliers of
Natural Raw Materials and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability-A First
Step Toward Sound Public Policy, 30 U. MCH. J.L. REFORM281 (1997).
'"Any substance can be hazardous. As the 16th century physician Paracelsus stated:
"What is not a poison? All things are poison and none without poison. Only the doso
determines that a thing is not a poison! " Charles E. Envay, 111, The Ingredient Supplier
Defense, 16 J. PROD. & TOXICSLIAB. 269,273 & n.15 (1994) (quotingAMEXtICANCONFERENCE
OF GOVERNNE~AL
INDus. HYGIENISTS,
THRESHOLD L~~TVALUES-DISCUSSION
ANJJ THIRmFIVE YEARINDEX WiTH RECObhlENDATIONS 332 (1984)).
la See, for example, George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d 507 (Wash. 19871, an indemnificntion action brought by a pharmaceutical company against the supplier of the nctivo
ingredient diethylstilbestrol (DES). Finding no proper liability for the ingredient supplior,
the court explained:
DES is not inherently harmful, and still is prescribed today for ailments not
associated with pregnant women. Thus,it is the way in which the ingredient
DES is used, and not DES per se, which is harmful.
[The FDA] requires
the tablet manufacturers ...to account for and warn of a drug's proporties.
... It would therefore be anomalous to require the raw [ingredient]
manufacturer to conduct separate tests to determine the adverse effects of tho
[end productl when by federal statute, the [end productl tablet manufncturer
bears this responsibility.
Id. at 515, discussed in Erway, supra note 183, at 274.
lss 425 So. 2d 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).

. ..
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fumigant claimed t o have injured farm workers. As the court
stated: "Mabeling and packaging requirements necessarily differ
depending on the particular [end product] formulation and, thus,
place the responsibility on the formulator for providing adequate
warning to the public . . . .n186
simil&ly, and illustrative of application of the least cost avoider
~~
the issue of the
approach, is Beauchamp v. R ~ s s e l l , 'involving
connection, if any, between an air valve component in a pneumatically-run pelletizer and the injury of plaintiffs spouse. The court
suggested that the duty to warn should properly be placed upon the
participant in manufacture with the greatest access to information
and the easiest means of its dissemination.'* In the words of the
court:
The responsibility for information collection and dissemination should rest on the party who has the greatest
access to the information and who can make it available
at the lowest cost. Where a component part is incorporated into another product, without material change, the
manufacturer of the part is in the best position to bear
this re~ponsibi1ity.l~~

Id a t 70; see also White v. Weiner, 562 k 2 d 378 (Pa.Super. Ct. 19891, afd, 583 A.2d
789 (Pa. 1991), a suit brought against Eli LiUy 8:Co. for failure to provide \7amings on the
chemical compound protarnine sulfate, supplied in bulk to Upjohn Compnny nnd employed
as an ingredient in a prescription drug sold by the latter. The Penxisylvanin court held thnt
LiUy had no tort duty to warn the end user, inasmuch as the end product producer wns in
a superior position to assess risks and decide upon the form and content of ndequnte Inbeling
and instructions. White, 562 k 2 d at 386.
Some components can be effectively labeled. For example, in F14 v. KDZ Syluan Paols,
Inc.,981 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1992)the court held as a matter of law thnt the manufacturer of
a replacement liner for an above-ground swimming pool is not relieved of tho duty to
warn-though the liner is considered a component part-because the liner mnnufnchver
knew the "liner would ultimately be incorporated into a pool, nnd nothing else? Id nt 11819. Thus, the producer could "reasonably foresee the potentinl risk of fnilingto aDiirs waning
labels." Id
lm 547 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
Id a t 1197.
Id;see also RESTATE^ (SECOND)
OF T o m 8 402A cmt. q (1979) vihich, whilo not
specifically addressing warnings, states with respect to strict liabiity j p m d l y : q t is no
doubt to be expected that where there is no change in the component part itself, but i t is
merely incorporated into somethinglarger, the strict liabiity
be found to carry through
to the ultimate user or consumer." The suggestion that in apportioning linbity between n
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Courts generally have responded to warnings issues involving
raw materials by finding no warning duty absent a showing that
the material itself-in its bulk form-was defective,''' or by
resort to several developed exceptions to seller warning obligations.
These exceptions have included, without limitation, defenses
pertaining to bulk sellers, extrapolations from the component part
supplier defense, the ingredient supplier defense, the sophisticated
user or sophisticated buyer defense, and the so-called learned
(better termed "informed") intermediary defense.''' Under one or
component part manufacturer and an assembler, liability should be assigned to the cheapest
cost avoider is explained in Richard D. Cunningham, Comment, Apportionment Between
Partmakers and Assemblers in Strict Liability, 49 U. CHI. L.REV.544,547 (1982):
Under this approach, the fact finder should simply ask who can more easily
detect and correct the defect. . m h e party with the lowest detection costs
would bear full liability, but could shift this liability to the party with tho
lowest correction costs if it provided a full warning of the detected dangers.
Ordinary, merchantable granite, for example, or aluminum of a particular gaugo,
would be representative examples of nondefective naturally occurring raw materials, as tho
propensities and the capacities of the materials are universally known.
lgl The Reporters state in comment o to Products Liability Restatement section 2:
Raw materials are a subset of the broader category of component parts.
Regarding the issue of defective design, it is diflticult to say how a basic raw
material such as sand, gravel or kerosine could be defectively designed. If
there is an inappropriate design in the use of such materials, tho failing
ordinarily is not attributable to the seller of the raw material, but rather to
the fabricator that put them to use. Regarding most raw materials, tho
manufacturer of the integrated product has such a large comparntivo
advantage in this respect that raw material sellers are generally not subject
to liability for defective design of the end product. The same considerations
apply to failure-to-warn claims against providers of ravr materials.
Many courts have invoked special doctrines such as the "raw material
supplier defense" or the "bulk salesfsophisticated purchaser rule" to negato
liability. Notwithstanding these judicial invocations, special rules are
unnecessary to absolve sellers in appropriate instances. If the materials are
not themselves defective within the terms of $5 1and 2, their sellers should
not be liable.
PRODUC~S
LIABILITYRESTATE~~NT,
supm note 1, § 2 cmt. o. In example 5 to section 2,
comment o, the Reporters hypothesize:
LMN Sand Co. sells sand in a large bulk volume. ABC Construction Co.
purchased one ton of sand to use in mixing cement. LMN is aware that
improper mixture of sand with other ingredients can cause the cement to
crack. ABC utilized LMN sand to form a supporting column in a home that
it built. As a result of the improper mixture the cement column gave way
during a mild earthquake and caused iqjury to the occupants of tho homo.
The injured occupants have no cause of action against LMN. The sand sold
by LMN is not defective within the meaning of Sec. 2.

..
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a combination of such approaches, there should be no warning

obligation placed upon the seller of a raw material that, during
transit t o an anticipated fabrication, allegedly causes injury a t the
intermediate stage. For example, in Spellmeyer v. 'Neyerhaeuser
Corp.,lg2a personal injury suit brought against the manufacturer
alleging that it failed to prepare wood pulp bales properly for
shipping, the court granted Weyerhaeuser summary judgment on
the strict liability count, explaining:
Imposition of strict liability is premised on the sound
policy consideration that the manufacturer who markets
his product for use and consumption by the general
public is best able to bear the risk of loss resulting from
a defective product. The thrust of Section 402A is,
accordingly, to protect the "ultimate user or consumer"
of the product. . . . In the instant case, Weyerhaeuser
produced and packaged a raw material in an intermediate state, which was stored awaiting shipment to
another processor. It did not harm or endanger any
"ultimate user or consumer;" only expert loaders and
expert carriers were required to deal with it. We
therefore conclude that, because of the character of the
"product" and the status of the plaintiff, the policy
considerations which support imposition of strict liability in other contexts are too severely diluted here and
dismissal was correct as to the strict liability theoly.lg3

Congruent authority is found in Pennwalt Corp. v. Superior
C o u e g 4 a case arising from injuries to an eighteen-year-old
plaintiff while he was attempting to compound chemicals at home
to create fireworks. The raw materials at issue included sodium
chlorate, aluminum powder, and sulphur, and plaintiffbrought suit
against the manufacturer, distributor and retailer of each chemical.

Id $ 2 crnt. o, example 5.
544 P.2d 107 Wash. Ct. App. 1975).
193Id. at 109-10.
* 218 Cal. Rptr. 675 (Ct. App. 1985) (not officially reported).
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The California Court of Appeals held that the bulk chemicals
manufacturer could not be liable to plaintiff for the sale of a
chemical that had been repackaged, relabeled, and distributed
through a retailer over which the manufacturer had no control,105
4. Discrete Residual Issue of Children Injured by Products
Intended for Adult Use. The Products Liability Restatement's
retention of a blanket rule that a seller need not warn of obvious
dangers has long seemed inadequate with respect to one small but
important plaintiff constituency: the child injured using a product
intended for adults. In products liability law generally, a manufacturer may be relieved of responsibility for an injury associated with
the use of or exposure to a defective product only where plaintiffs
conduct is so unforeseeable as to constitute the sole legal cause of
his injuries.lg6 A manufacturer's duty to warn of risks is not
lg5

As the Court explained:

[A] duty is only imposed on the manufacturer to warn the ultimate consumor
in those cases that "involve tangible items that could be labeled, or sent into
." A bulk
the chain of commerce with the manufactureis instructions
manufacturer "must be absolved at such time as it provides adequato
warnings to the distributor who subsequently packages, labels and markets
the product. . .."
Sodium Chlorate has many legitimate uses, some of which involvo using it
in conjunction with other chemicals. Pennwalt cannot be expected to
anticipate every possible use and issue warnings of any potential danger
involved in each such use. To hold otherwise would place an impossible
burden on a bulk manufacturer which would be tantamount to imposing
absolute liabiity for injury resulting from use of a product not claimed to bo
otherwise defective.
Id. at 677 (citations omitted); see also Walker v. Stauffer Chem. Corp., 96 Cal. Rptr. 803,
80406 (Ct. App. 1971)(arising &om plaintifPs injury caused by drain cleaner that exploded).
Finding for defendant StaufTer Chemical, the bulk manufacturer of sulfuric acid (ono of tho
ingredients of the cleaner), the court stated:
We are referred to no California case, nor has independent research revealed
any such, extending the strict liability of the manufacture (seller) to the
supplier of a substance to be used in compounding or formulating the product
which eventually causes injury to an ultimate consumer. On the contrary
this dearth of authority indicates to us a reluctance on the part of the Bench
and Bar to consider such an extension necessary or desirable for tho
protection of the ultimate consumer.
Id. at 805-06.
lg6 See, for example, Kriz v. Schum, 549 N.E.2d 1155,1160-61(N.Y. 19891, a suit brought
by a swimmer rendered a paraplegic after sliding head first down a pool slide into an abovoground pool. Reviewing the Appellate Division's reversal of the trial court's grant of
summary judgement, New York's highest court held that the swimmer's conduct in sliding
into a pool of unknown depth was not an unforeseeable superseding cause. Id.

. ..
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contined to risks involving intended uses of the product, but also
foreseeable misuses.197 Foreseeability "does not require that the
particular circumstances of a given accident be foreseen," but
rather that an accident "of the type that [occurred was] objectively
reasonable t o expect.n198
Although the risks attending incautious use of many ordinary
products is obvious to practically all adults, examples abound in
which '(1) the product is sold routinely for use in settings where
children may be expected; and (2) the risk is not so obvious to a
child as it is to an adult. In such circumstances, courts routinely
refuse t o apply the open and obvious rule in a strict sense, instead
shaping the foreseeability requirement to the specific situations of
the cases before them.
Illustrative is Strothkamp v. Chesebrowh-Pond's, Inc.,lm the
appeal of a trial court's judgment n.0.v. following an award of
actual and punitive damages to a child who, at age five, severely
injured his ear using appellee's Q-Tips brand cotton swabs.
Reversing in part, and remanding for a new trial on actual
damages, the court explained:
[Als the foreseeable risk of injury increases so does the
duty of care. The manufacturer or seller of products
may satisfy this increasing duty of care in several mays;
including a warning or packaging in child resistant
containers.
Where the prudent manufacturer mould foresee that
a condition or propensity of the product is likely not to
be fully k n o m and appreciated by those using it, and
that some use to which the article is likely to be put mill
197 For example, in Tn'vino v. Jarnesway Corp., 539 N.Y.S.2d 123 (App. Div. 19891, the
court addressed an injury arising from the ignition of a child's Hnllomecn costume cr&cd
from cosmetic cotton-rayon p& glued to a pajama costume exterior to simulnh n fur coat.
Reversing summaryjudgment granted to the puffmanufacturer, the court explnined: 'While
we agree that plaintiffs use of the cotton puffmas a misuse in the sense thnt it rim outside
the scope of the apparent purpose for which the puffs \ . ~ e mnnufnctured,
r~
\ve cnnnot agee
that plaintiffs misuse was unforeseeable as a matter of law." Id nt E4.
Yassin v. Certified Grocers, 502 N.E.2d 315,324 (ill.App. Ct. 1986). In Yassin. n
child's hand was injured in a grocery store meat tenderizer. Id a t 318-19.
No. 60645,1993 R% 79239 (hfo. Ct. App. Mar. 23,1993).
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be unreasonably dangerous without that knowledge, the
duty of care requires a warning.200

In Bean v. B E C ~ r p . ; a~ ~
wrongtl death suit arising from a
fire caused by a disposable butane lighter, the Alabama Supreme
Court entertained the claimant's argument that the product's spare
warning-"keep out of the reach of childrenn-was inadequate. In
the court's words:
[Tlhe Beans argued that the warnings were inadequate
because they (1)failed to warn about the attractiveness
of the lighters to small children, (2) failed to warn that
small children could easily operate the lighters, and (3)
failed t o warn of the serious danger of fires started by
small children with lighters. The Beans argue that BIC
failed to show the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact to be determined by the jury. We agree.n202
Telling as well is the decision in Shaw v. Petersen;03 a parental
suit against a swimming pool owner emanating from injuries to a
nineteen-month old child, in which the court stated: " 'The
characteristics of children are proper matters for consideration in
determining what is ordinary care with respect to them, and there
may be a duty to take precautions with respect to those of tender
years which would not be necessary in the case of adults.9 n204
Appropriate, then, to the evaluation of a manufacturer's warnings
obligations concerning a product intended for adult use, but which
will in the ordinary course come into contact with children, is
consideration of "the ability of the child to appreciate the risk
involved."0' 5
A Restatement-based interpretation that omits
consideration of the specter of injury to children whose age,
experience and judgment preclude full appreciation of risk, and

'02

Id. at *4*5.
597 SO.2d 1350 (Ala. 1992).
Id. at 1353.
821 P.2d 220 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 222 (quoting Shannon v. Butler Homes, Inc., 428 P.2d 990,995 (Ariz. 1967)).
Id. at 223.
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therefore informed consent, fails the autonomy interest of warnings
jurisprudence dating to BoreL206
B. SEVERAL LIABILITY FOR NONECONOMIC HARhI

1. Generally. In general terms, under joint and several liability,
a tort victim injured by two or more tortfeasors "may recover his
total damages from any one of the actors, regardless of the portion
of fault attributable t o that t~rtfeasor.*~~
Joint liability benefits
the plaintiff by enlarging the likelihood of full recovery for proved
harm when one or more of the joint tortfeasors are either insolvent
or cannot be joined in the action.208
Aaron Tmerski has described the conventionaljoint and several
liability approach as "accentuat [ingl and exacerbat[ing] all the
imperfections in the present tort compensation system.nz09 A
principal argument against retention of joint and several liability
is that the doctrine provides an incentive for plaintiffs to collect
Bore1v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); see supm note
174 (discussingBod).
'07 Nancy L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation. A Systematic Evaluation of
Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Seveml Liability, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 628,
635 (1988);see also hfICHAEL HOENIG, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: SUBSTANTIVE,PROCEDURALAND
PonmIssvEs 191(1992) ("At common law, the joint and several linbiility imposed upon joint
tortfeasors was indivisible. Thus, any one of the joint tortfeasors was liable to the injured
party for the entire damage." (citing hiusco v. Conte, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589, 593 (App. Div.
1954))). Hoenig further cites Musco as suggestingthat 'Yhe common-la~v
doctrine wns &ed
at deterring the commission of a single rrrongfd act by the concert of several persons who
were proceeding in unisonn Id.
Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among hfultiple Responsible Causes: A
Principled Defense of Joint and SeveralLiabilityforActual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21U.C.
DAVISL. REV. 1141,114243 (1988).
'09 Aaron D. Twerski, The Joint TortfeasorLegislative Revolt? A Ratwnnl Response to the
Critics, 22 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1125, 1143 (19891, discussed in Richard C. Ausness, An
Insurance-Based CompensationSystemfor Product-RelatedInjuries, 58 U. P m . L. REV. 669,
703 & a173 (1997).
The doctrine's distortion of realistic settlement negotiations is described by HOENIG,
supm
note 207, a t 193, in these words:
The more significant policy of encouraging reasonnble settlements is
undermined because realistic evaluations of true culpability need not impact
upon the settlement demands. An artificially high range of settlement
evaluations ensues. The tendency is to look at overall exposure, i.e., "how
many millions will this jury possibly award to this plaintiff?," rnther than
"how much of the potential award is really attributable to this defendnnt's
fault?"
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their award from the party with the deepest pocket, not the party
whose causal contribution to the harm may have been the greatest?1°
At the state level, joint and several liability has been modified or
abolished by at least thirty-three states?'' Such reforms have
ranged from total abolition, to abolition for defendants fifty percent
or less liable, t o abolition with limited exceptions.212
Even with this widespread modification of joint liability, the
Senate authors of the Reform Act claim that under the law of most
states, joint and several liability translates into "deep pocket"
litigation, meaning "that a defendant who is found only one percent
at fault can be burdened with an entire damages award.n213 ~h~
A.L.I. Reporters' Study: Enterprise Liability for Personal Injury
also recommended reforming the doctrine of joint and several
liability?"
The keform Act proposes adoption of the so-called "California
rule," under which defendants are liable only for their " 'fair share'
of responsibility for noneconomic loss, such as pain and suffering."215 The Reform Act would set no limits on noneconomic
'I0 See Larry Pressler & Kevin V. Schieffer, Joint and Several Liability: A Case for
Reform, 64 DENV. U. L.REV. 651,652 (1988) (arguing that "plaintiffs often target porsons
they perceive to have the greatest resources from which to pay claims").
1I' See Shuchman, supra note 125, a t 491 & n.27 (referencing Insurance Information
Z,
NEGLIGENCE
app. B
Institute figures as of 1994); see also VICTORS C ~ A R TCO~IPARATIVE
(3d ed. 1994) (listing statutes).
2n BEACON
HILL INST., SUFFOLK U W . , THEECONOblICS OF MASSACHUSMTS TORTL h l V
17-18 tbl. 2 (Draft 1997).
'* S. REP. NO. 105-32, a t 55 11.202 (1997) (citing Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 516 So.
2d 198 @la. 1987)).
'I4 2 REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 123, a t 147.
61' S. REP. NO. 105-32, a t 55; see, e.g., CAL.CIV. CODE9 1431.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998)
(enacting "California rulen); NEB. REV. STAT.9 25-21,185.10 (1995) (same).
This proposal differs from that of 2 R?dPORTERS' STUDY,
supra note 123, at 128, which
proposes the following approach:
[Where] the risk [exists] that one of several defendants is insolvent or
unavailable[, this burden1 should not be shouldered exclusively by solvent codefendants or by the plaintiff. Rather, this risk should be shared by both the
plaintiff and the defendants. Each solvent defendant would be liable for an
insolvent or unavailable defendant's share of anyjudgment only in proportion
to the solvent defendant's negligence or equitable contribution to the
plaintiffs loss.
'This 'allocative' approach," the study concludes, %odd more fairly apportion the risk of
insolvency or unavailability than does either the traditional [joint and several liability]
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harm, and the calculation of several liability would take into
account the causal contribution of all entities, be they parties,
nonparties, settling parties, or
Joint and several
liability mould be retained with respect to economic damages.
Reform Act proponents have presented extensive evidence of the
of joint and several
"extreme and unwanted c~nsequences"~'~
liability. One particularly strong example of the negative impact
of the doctrine is its effect upon suppliers of raw materials for a
variety of products. At congressional hearings a sports equipment
manufacturer executive testified that her company, one of only two
domestic manufacturers of football helmets, did not manufacture a
baseball safety product "because no raw material supplier would
accept the potential liability of supplying components for the new
safety product.n218
2. Corrective Justice. Opponents of the Reform Act's limitations
on joint and several liability are primarily concerned that the
proposed rule mill fail to adequately compensate injured parties.
The most conspicuous congressional critic of statutory modification
of joint and several liability has been Senator Ernest Hollings, who
castigates Senate Bill 648 as a reversal of the historical achievement of joint and several liability. The Senator lauds the doctrine
in its full common-law application for its role in ensuring that "all
persons involved in distributing and profiting from a dangerous or
defective product, and who have engaged in irresponsible behavior
that led to the plaintiffs injury caused by the product, [ d l be held
liable for the plaintiffs harm.-219

approach, which places this risk on defendants alone, or certain recent legkhtive
modifications which impose this risk entirely on the plaintiff? 2 id. at E8-29.
216 S. 648,105th Cong. 9 110 (1997); accord DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc, 828 P A 140,145
(CaL 1992) (holding that California rule limits joint linbility for noneconomic hnrm to
defendanfs causal sharek Fabre v. hiarin, 623 So. 2d 1182,1184 @In. 1993)(" Tho obvious
purpose of the statute was to partially abrogate the doctrine ofjoint rind several Linbiity by
barring its application to non-economic damage. To exclude from tho computation the fault
of an entity that happens not to be a party to the particular proceeding would thwart this
intent.' " (quoting blessmer v. Teacheis Ins.Co., 588 So. 2d 610,611-12 (Fla Disk Ct. App.
1991))), overruled on othergrounds by W e b v. Tallahassee hiem? Med. Ctr., 659 So. 243 249
(Fla. 1995).
S. REP. NO. 10532, at 55.
218 I d at 56 & nn.203-04.
2* I d at 70.
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Those opposing placing limitations upon pure joint and several
liability for noneconomic damages might endorse the comments of
former California Chief Justice Bird, who once stated in dissent:
For a child who has been paralyzed from the neck
down, the only compensation for a lifetime without play
comes f!rom noneconomic damages. Similarly, a person
who has been hideously disfigured receives only noneconomic damages to ameliorate the resulting humiliation
and embarrassment.
Pain and suffering are afflictions shared by all human
beings, regardless of economic status. For poor plaintiffs, noneconomic damages can provide the principal
source of compensation for reduced lifespan or loss of
physical capacity. . . . mhese plaintiffs may be unable
to' prove substantial loss of future earnings or other
economic damage^.^"
Thus, according to Bird, and presupposing identical accidents to
two economically disparate plaintiffs, the less wealthy plaintiff
must rely more heavily upon noneconomic damages to achieve just
recompense for the harm. In this situation, the poorer plaintiff
bears the brunt of the several liability for noneconomic harm
provision, because he will be the plaintiff who bears the greater
risk of achieving a verdict that fails to fully compensate him in the
event that one or more of the tortfeasors are unavailable or
insolvent.221
=Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665,689 (Cal. 1985)(Bird, C.J.,dissenting),
discussed in Andrew F. Popper, A Federal Tort Law Is Still a Bad Idea: A Comment on
Senate Bill 687,16 J . PROD. & TOXCS LIAB. 105,12425 (1994).
Chief Justice Bird's concerns are illustrated by a question posed by Mmlc Grady:
"Suppose a doctor makes an error in two cases. In one the patient is a person earning
$15,000 a year and in another it is a person earning $150,000 a year. Which pationt collects
supra note 26, at 432.
the larger benefit payment (damages award) from the doctor?" GRADY,
Grady's question highlights the arguably regressive impact of a several damages for
noneconomic harm reform. Apart from medical and rehabilitative costs, economic harm for
accident-related loss is tied substantially to income level. Even assuming identical iqjuries,
medical and rehabilitative expenses, and time out of work, those plaintiffs enjoying olevated
incomes will, should they prevail at trial, receive more for their economic loss than will thoir
lower earning counterparts. Thus, preservation of joint and several liability for economic
harm only, while facially neutral, operates to the greater advantage of tho wealthy. Id.
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Similar concern for the plight of the poorer plaintiff is found in
the Legal Realist argument "that one important reason for tort
liability was to conscript the providers of economic goods and
services to purchase insurance (third-party insurance) for the
benefit of their customers.n222As Grady explains, "Of course, the
customers could purchase their o m first-party insurance, but the
Realists feared that many consumers, because of poverty or
improvidence, would decide not to do so."= Accordingly, if, as a
class, poorer persons are less likely than wealthier persons to have
procured first-party insurance, the risk of incomplete redress for
noneconomic harm falls more heavily upon the poor. The wealthy
may have .first-party insurance which includes provisions for pain
and suffering or quality of life compensation even prior to subrogated litigation against multiple tortfeasors. This hypothesis is not
affected by the supposition that a legal change to several liability
would push first-party insurance rates upwards, as higher firstparty insurance rates would only accentuate the impact of already
existing economic realities distinguishing those with such insurance
and those without.
A further attack on the Reform Act rule is launched by Andrew
F. Popper, who has mitten:
The mere fact that pain and suffering are difficult to
quantify should not mean that plaintiffs are somehow
not entitled to joint and several liability. . . By making
joint and several liability unavailable for noneconomic
damages, those plaintiffs with the most devastating
injuries would end up undercompensated, even though
they have proved the liability of the defendant.='

.

In addition, Popper argues, tertiary accident costs are elevated by
any several liability reform proposal, in that "[sluch victims mould
be forced to pursue [in separate litigation] each party who had been
in any way responsible for the victim's injury.n2W
Id
Id
Popper, supm note 220, at 125 (criticizing several liability provision of enrlier reform
proposal).
=Id.
2p
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The Reporters of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionmen.6!26are advancing as one option for Institute evaluation a
rule that would track the Reform Act in confining joint liability to
economic harm while providing several liability under applicable
comparative fault principles for noneconomic harm.227 The
Apportionment Restatement Reporters suggest two reasons for
preserving joint liability only for economic harm. The first
rationale is that other compensation schemes, such as workers'
compensation, do so.228 This option's reasoning fails to take into
account that the workers' compensation scheme has always been
visualized as a bargained-for exchange in which those suffering
workplace injuries could recover economic loss without being
subjected t o the uncertainty and expense of tort litigation. The tort
system remained available for recovery of other losses for which
parties other than the employer are responsible. The employer,
who for a finite and relatively predictable assessment in workers'
compensation insurance coverage would be relieved of defending
tort claims for greater amounts, would also benefit from this
exchange.
Thus, within the workers' compensation system, both workers
and employers relinquish something of value in order to achieve
other benefits. To use the logic of workers' compensation as a
justification for several liability for economic harm as a "reform"
rings tinny, because unlike the respective sacrifices made by
workers and employers when workers' compensation was created,
the Reform Act and the potential Apportionment Restatement
provision bring nothing to the bargaining table for plaintiffs.
Rather than enjoying a filial bond with other economic-harm, strictliability, social insurance schemes, the latter approaches are totally
parasitic, as they reduce or eliminate potential claims and offer
nothing in return.
The second rationale advanced by the authors of the Apportionment Restatement several liability option is based in part upon the
assumption that "providing a damaged plaintiff with . economic

..

P6 RESTATEhfENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONhENT (Council Draft No. 2, 1997)
[hereinafter APPORTION~ENTRESTATEMENT].
P7 Id. 8 25E & cmt. c.
P8 Id. 5 25E cmt. c.
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damages is more important than providing fullrecovery of noneconomic damages."229 That recovery of one dimension (economic loss)
of plaintiffs damages may be more pressing than the other
(noneconomicloss) scarcelyjustifies restricting plaintiffs' access to
the latter and venerable avenue to full redress of plaintiffs' total
proven harm. Furthermore, the Reporters offer no empirical
evidence to support the supposition that injured plaintiffs as a
group mould more jealously guard a right of joint recovery of
economic damages over noneconomic, or the reverse.
Able criticism of such proposed "reform" is raised by corrective
justice proponents such as Richard W. Wright, who uses the
paradigm of a coffee poisoning in which an intentional poisoner and
a negligent poisoner each lace decedent's coffee with a lethal
dose.230 Upon a jury finding that the intentional poisoner is 90%
responsible, and the negligent poisoner 10% responsible, and
assumingthe unavailability or insolvency of the 90%culpable actor,
Wright questions the fairness of a several liability approach that
would confine the estate's claim to 10%recovery.231 An important
part of Wright's argument is its claim that the jointly liable party's
successful or unsuccessful contribution or indemnity claim against
another tortfeasor "is secondary to the plaintiffs prior and independent corrective justice claim against each t~rtfeasor.''~~~
In other
words, even as between the injured plaintiff and the only slightly
culpable defendant, principles of corrective justice dictate that
compensating the plaintiff has priority over the slightly culpable
defendant's quarrel with disproportionate liability.
Id
Richard W- Wright, The Logic and Fairness of Joint and Seueml Liability, 23
ST. U.L.REV. 4559-62 (1992).
Id. a t 60.
PZ Id. at 61, discussed in Lilly v. hfarcal Rope 6:Rigging, 682 N.E.2d 481,488 (Ill.App.
Ct. 1997); cf. DIAMOND ET At., supm note 42, a t 228:
m e r e ] all of the joint tortfeasors, by definition, acted tortiously and actudy
and proximately caused the plaintiffs iqjury[,] [iln most cases, under usual
'but for' causation analysis, the injury mould have been totally avoided if m y
of the defendants had acted nonculpably. In this sense, the percentage
allocation determined by the fact-finder is only a comparative measure of on
ideal apportionment among wrongdoers, each of whom, it can k argued,
should be fully liable to the plaintiff for all the plaintiffs losses beauso m y
one of them could have, by acting non-negligently, protected the plaintiff from
any injury.
PO
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For its insight, Wright's argument seems limited by its premise
that each poisoner "put enough poison in plaintiffs coffee to kill
her.n233 This scenario does not directly speak to the joint and
several liability examples that proponents of several liability love
to hate, i.e., when a defendant's substandard conduct contributes
only minimally to plaintiffs harm, but imposition of joint and
several liability burdens that defendant with the majority, or even
the totality of plaintiffs proved damages. Emblematic of the
problem is the notorious plaintiil's verdict in Walt Disney World Co.
v. Wood,234 which involved an amusement park bumper car
accident in which plaintiffs judgment-proof fiance was adjudged
85%responsible, plaintiff 14%responsible, and Walt Disney World
1%r e ~ p o n s i b l e .Disney
~~
ultimately was held liable not only for
its participation in the injury, but also for the lion's share of the
insolvent tortfeasor's liability, leaving Disney responsible for 86%
of the damages in a suit in which its causal contribution was but
3. Eficiency-Deterrence. No substantial economic analysis seems
to have been devoted to evaluating the efficiencies of specific
"reformn measures abrogating common-law joint and several
liability for noneconomic loss. A brief examination of the various
economic views, however, reveals that the Reform Act provision
would have mixed success in terms of its evaluation under economics principles.
The early California Supreme Court decision in Ybarra v.
S ~ a n g a r d understood
,~~
ordinarily as a res ipsa loquitur case,
demonstrates how economic principles can be argued to support

Rope & Rigging,682 N.E.2d at 487.
515 So. 2d 198 @la. 1987). The plaintiff in the case sustained injuries when tho
bumper car she was driving was rammed from behind by the car driven by her fiancb. Sho
sued Disney, who then sought contribution &om her fianc6. Id. at 199.
Id.
Ps Id.; see also 2 REPORTERS'
STUDY,
supra note 123, a t 151 n.28 (discussing Disney).
208 P.2d 445 (Cal. 1949). Ybarra was a suit against the nurses and doctors in
attendance during plaintifi's surgery, as well as the hospital at which the surgery took plnco.
Id. Plaintiff was anesthetized for an appendectomy, but while he was unconscious, ho
suffered a partially paralyzing injury to a nerve in his shoulder. Id. at 445-46. Bocauso
plaintiff was unconscious and could not prove the cause of his injury, the court shifted tho
burden to the defendants to prove that they were not responsible. Id. a t 447. Any defendant
who could not so prove should, the court concluded, be held liable. Id.
233 Marcal
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retention of conventionaljoint and several liability. Of the various
defendants, nurse Thompson is surely the attending health
professional whose commissions or omissions were least likely to
have been a substantial factor in plaintiffs paralysis and atrophySa8 Yet even conceding that of several tortfeasors it is most
efficient t o hold only the one who can most readily detect and
correct the risk liable for failure to do so, nurse Thompson surely
is a cheaper cost avoider than at least some of the other parties
(e-g., the plaintiff or the hospital staff at large). Should one or
more of the surgeons have exacted binding exculpatory agreements
from plaintiff prior to the operation, or should they by demonstration of appropriate care be able to rebut the inference raised by
application of res ipsa loquitur, the several liability approach
advanced by the Reform Act would leave plaintiff able to recover
only a fraction of his noneconomic damages. Certainly in this
setting, principles of enterprise liability (a Rubicon reached and
crossed years ago) commend retention of joint liability as to the
remaining defendants, including nurse Thompson.
A saving efficiency argument favoring some form of reform along
several liability lines (although not necessarily that contained in
the Reform Act) is found in Calabresi's least cost avoider approach.
As noted, Posner agrees that as to risk remediation, me do not want
all joint tortfeasors to participate, but rather only the tortfeasor
who can take action most efficiently. In the ordinary course, and
whether the defendant is an automobile manufacturer or an
environmental polluter, the tortfeasor whose contribution to a
plainWs harm is the greatest will be the tortfeasor who can most
readily and efficiently detect and remedy the risk.
Following this line of reasoning, the greatest incentives for
efficient (and societally acceptable) conduct should ordinarily rest
with the party that can foresee or remedy that wasteful or harmful
conduct, while proportionately lesser incentives would be apparent
to tortfeasors whose likely causal contribution would be less. To
conclude otherwise would, in Judge Higgenbotham's Testbank

PS See RICHARD k POSNER,
TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOBUC ANALYSIS 319 (1982)
(discussingdefendants' burden and implying that Thompson should bo errculpntcd).
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reasoning, make potential liability so great in relation to wrongdoing as t o disassociate conduct from consequences.239Accordingly,
several liability's preservation of a proportionality between riskcreation and potential liability is probably the optimal approach to
satisfaction of deterrence goals.
Nevertheless, simple efficiency principles seemingly support
retention of joint liability in some form for noneconomic loss.
Extrapolating from an example provided by Robin Paul M a l l ~ y , ~ ~ '
imagine a suburban water district and a residential water wholesaler together selling filtered well water to local residents. The
water of six particular homes is uniquely affected by contaminants
in such quantities that make the water responsible for mild
intestinal illness in those who drink it. Suppose further that the
personal injury value is $100 per home, for a total of $600. Two
options exist for remedying the problem. First, a water filtering
device can be installed at the district distribution point at a cost of
$300. Alternatively, each resident can be provided with a home
water purifier at a cost of $75 per home, at a total cost of $450.
Installing the filter at the distribution point eliminates total
damages of $600 at a cost of $300, and represents the efficient
economic solution.
Under the Reform Act approach to several liability for noneconomic damages, a resident enduring pain and suffering loss due t o
intestinal illness caused by the contaminated water would be
unable to recover some proportion of his proven harm should one
of the two arguable tortfeasors (the water district and the residential water wholesaler) be insolvent. In addition to the hardship
imposed upon residents by this illness, such an approach invites
several inefficiencies, not the least of which is that a several
liability for noneconomic harm approach undermines the economic
efficiency of the least cost avoider approach. Absent a rule of joint
liability that would obligate acknowledgement that the capacity of
either joint tortfeasor to recognize and remediate the risk was
superior to that of plaintiffs, the potential tortfeasors and the
P3 See

supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text (discussing Louisiana ex rel. Gusto v.

MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985)).
WY,
supra note 121, at 35-38. Malloy acknowledgesthe similarity of his examplo
to that found in A. MrrCHELL POLINSKY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOhUCS 11-14
(1983).
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potential victims alike are encouraged to undertake inefficient
measures. The remaining tortfeasor that will be left answerable in
damages knows at the very least that its liability mill be for less
than the entirety of plaintiffs loss, and thus has less incentive to
remedy the risk than it would under conventional joint liability.
The potential victims, in turn, recognizingthat should illness occur,
they w i l l potentially be able only to gain reparation for a fraction
of their noneconomic harm, may be prompted to take measures in
their o m hands, by, for example, adopting the inefficient course of
installing filters in individual homes.
In long latency disease litigation, the Reform Act change in joint
and several liability will actually create factfinding cost and
complexity. Absent any authority for application of market share
liability for asbestos claims or other claims not involving completely
fungible characteristics, courts in asbestos cases particularly have
frequently found expert testimony suggesting a zero tolerance for
the substance, i.e., that exposure to any amount of the product
sufficed t o support a jury conclusion that each manufacturer in an
ordinarily multiple defendant claim was jointly and severally liable
for plainWs disease.241 As is generally known, many of the
original producers of asbestos products are now bankrupt. The
Reform Act approach would resuscitate the incentive of any
particular defendant to dispute a zero tolerance thesis, and to
attempt instead to produce proof that plaintiffs exposure to its
product was so limited in time, proximity and density that its
contribution to plaintiffs harm was small when compared to the
causal contribution of the products of other manufacturers. Such
medical-legal issues would necessarily be resolved in mini-trials of
some nature, at substantial cost to the parties and to the judicial
system.242

"'

For example, in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076,1094 (5th Cir.
1973), a plaintiffs suit against 11 asbestos manufacturers, the court stated thnt it was
"impossible, as a practical matter, to determine with absolute certainty \vhich particular
exposure to asbestos dust resulted in injury to Borel."
242 Interestingly, it was the New Jersey Supreme Court's opposition to tho pohtinl
bumper crop of mini-trials regarding the state of scientific knoivlcdge thnt Id it in Beshada
v. Johns-ManviUe Products Corp., 447 k 2 d 539,545-49 (N.J. 19821, to rulo thnt in mbatos
cases, state-of-the-art would not be a triable issue.
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Calabresi suggests that, absent a coherent application of
comparative fault to joint and several liability circumstances, the
fairness or unfairness of retaining joint and several liability cannot
be gauged. Assume, Calabresi proposes, a 60% responsible
defendant, a 10% responsible defendant, and a 30% responsible
plainLiff.243 Assume further that the 60% responsible defendant
is unavailable or bankrupt. The jury places 70% of responsibility
on the 10% responsible defendant, and 30% responsibility upon
plaintiff. If the jury intended that plaintiff, even though three
times more responsible than the remaining defendant, recover 70%
of the total harm from him, the result, Calabresi writes, "seems
both unfair and contrary to what the jury found.n244 If, on the
other hand, the jury meant that the defendants together were 70%
responsible, and that the 10%/60%allocation between them "was
no more than an equitable split as t o them, a split that did not
concern their individual responsibility to plaintiff at all," then,
Calabresi suggests, retention of joint and several liability in a
comparative responsibility context "might be as fair as the previous
hypothetical made it seem unfair."245 Until, Calabresi concludes,
courts appreciate "the full consequences of the shift from an all or
nothing rule to a splitting rule[,] . . . efforts at reform are bound t o
be haphazard and nonsensical.n246
C. LIMITED IMMUN'ITY FOR NONMANUFACTURING SELLERS

1. Generally. It has been estimated that under the law of about
twenty-nine states, nonmanufacturing sellers may be liable in
products liability even though they contributed in no affirmative
way to the claimed product risks.247 These sellers are, nevertheless, drawn into the maw of products liability litigation.248

Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 14, at 880-81.
Id.
z4s Id. at 881; see also DIAMONI)
ET AL., supra note 42, at 228 (conceding that "from n
compensation perspective, 'joint and several' liability better insures compensation to tho
plaintifi").
Calabresi & Cooper, supra note 14, at 881.
S. REP.NO.105-32, at 33 (1997).
U8 DAVIDG.OWEN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY: CASESAND bfAl%RItUS 76455 (3d ed. 1996).
263

"'
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Should they be found liable for plaintiffs harm, they must seek
indemnification or contribution from the party, ordinarily the
manufacturer, whose active substandard conduct bears a closer
causal connection to plaintiffs harm than does the seller's. This
approach, the Reform Act authors argue, "generates substantial,
unnecessary legal costs, which are passed on to consumers in the
form of higher prices. A more efficient approach would be for the
claimant to sue the product seller only if the product seller is
directly at fault."249
~ G e r o ustates
s
have enacted statutes permitting nonrnanufacturer liability only upon a showing of manufacturer insolvency or
~navailability.~'Consistent with the approach taken in twentyone states,251Reform Act section 103 " 'recognize[s] the unfairness
and illogic of imposing "strictnliability upon retailers and wholesalers who neither participate in the design process for products they
sell, nor create warnings or instructions for a product. n Z 2
Reform Act section 103:
would hold product sellers, such as wholesalers and
retailers, liable only if they are directly at fault for a
harm (e.g., misassembled the product or failed t~ convey
appropriate warnings to customers), unless the manufacturer of the product is out of business or otherwise
not available to respond in a lawsuit.w3

S. REP. No. 105-32.at 33.
E-g., C0I.D. REV. STAT. 13-21-402(1)(1987);TENN. CODEANN. 8 29-28-106(Supp.
1995);WfiH REV. CODEANN. 7.72.040(1) West 1992).
The statutes of these states are collected in S. REP. NO. 10532 at 33 6:n.108:
COLO. REV. STAT.3 13-21-402;DEL CODEANN. tit. 18 7001(1989);0.C.GA
51-1-11.1(Supp.1995);IDAHO CODE§ 6-1407(1990);735 LLL COD. STAT.
512-621West 1992);IOWA CODE 613.18 (Supp.1995);KAN. STAT. ANN. 8 603306 (1994); KY.REV.STAT.ANN. 8 411.340 @fichie 1992); LA.REV. STAT.
ANN. 3 2800.53 West 1991); h a . CODEANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. 5311
(1982);h l r c ~CoarP.
.
LAWS 8 600.2947(6)(1996);h m . STAT.Q 544.41 (1994);
&lo. REV.STAT. 537.762 (1988);NEB. REV. STAT.Q 25-21,181(1995);N J .
STAT.ANN. § 2k58C-9(1995);N.C. GEN.STAT.§ 99B-2(1995);N.D. CENT.
CODE 8 28-01.3-04(Supp.1995);OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 2307.78 (Anderson
1991);S.D.CODIFIED
LAWS 8 20-9-9(hfichie 1995);TENN. CODE ANN. 9 29-28106;WASH. REV. CODEANN. 7.72.040.
253 S. REP. NO. 105-32,at 33 & n.107 (quotinghkdden, supm note 61,at 570).
I d at 33-34.
250
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As the Senate authors explain, Reform Act section 103(b)(l):
provides that a product seller shall be treated as the
product manufacturer and shall be liable for the claimant's harm as if the product seller were the manufacturer if (A) the manufacturer is not subject to service of
process under the laws of any state in which the action
might have been brought by the claimant, or (B)the
court determines that the claimant would be unable to
enforce a judgment against the manufacturer.254
By way of illustration, the accompanying Senate Report states:

a judgment would be unenforceable if the court finds
that the manufacturer is bankrupt, insolvent, or otherwise unable to pay. A claimant may recover from the
product seller for harms that were caused by the
manufacturer if one of the two provisions applies, and
if the claimant proves that the manufacturer would
have been liable under state
The Reform Act also precludes liability based upon assignment of
an absence of due care (negligence) to a product seller where the
seller's conduct consisted solely of an alleged failure to inspect a
product where there was no reasonable opportunity to inspect the
product in a manner which would, in the exercise of reasonable
care, have revealed the aspect of the product which allegedly
caused the claimant's harm.n256
2. Corrective Justice-Morality. Senate Bill 648 would affect, but
in no meaningful way diminish, a plaintiffs access to money
damages for tortiously-caused harm. The only two claims that

Id. at 35.
Id. As regards statute of limitations implications for the suit in which manufacturor's
insolvency is not discovered until such time as the limitations period has run, section
103(b)(2) provides that "the statute of limitations applicable to claims asserting liability of
a product seller as a manufacturer shall be tolled from the date of the filing of a complaint
against the manufacturer to the date that judgment is entered against the manufacturor."
Id.
2~ S. 648,105th Cong. 8 103(a)(2)(B)(1997).
2M
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characteristically might be pursued solely against the retailer,
intentional torts and breach of express warranty,257 are preserved.258
The Reform Act provision jump starts the litigation process by
providing that only the genuine parties in interest d
l
,
as an initial
matter, appear before the court. Where insolvency or lack of
personal jurisdiction vitiates the ideal of requiring plaintiffs to
proceed against the manufacturer, Senate Bill 648 circumstances
plaintiffs as they mere before: they may proceed against the
nonmanufacturing seller as though it were the manufacturer.
Indeed, the practical effect of the federal Reform Act is more
favorable to the plaintiff than the current laws of the many states
that provide only for negligence-based causes of action against
nonmanufacturing sellers.z59 In those states, an absent or insolvent manufacturer can leave plaintiff totally without a remedy
absent a showing of negligence on the part of the wholesaler or the
retailer.
3. Efficiency-Deterrence. In the words of Richard Ausness, "the
imposition of liability upon nonmanufacturers provides only
marginal benefits to accident victims while unnecessarily increasing litigation costs for everyone.n260
A . oft-cited rationale for holding nonmanufacturing sellers liable
as though they were manufacturers is that wholesalers and
retailers susceptibleto such liabilitywould influence manufacturers
to make reasonably safe products.261 It has, however, never been

See 1MADDEN,
supra note 105, $5 5.2.5 (describing cause of action for breach of
express warranty)).
25S S. 648 $ 103(a)(2).
259 See 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 1 90,000 (June 1993June 1997) (collecting statutes,
many of which reject strict liability standard for nonmanufacturing sellers).
260 Ausness, supra note 209, a t 705. Ausness continues:
For example, nonmanufacturers who are sued by accidentvictims m o t rely
on the product manufacturer to look out for their interests, but must
participate in any litigation that occurs. In addition, v~holesnlersand
retailers frequently have to bear the expense of a second In~vsuitin order to
obtain indemnity from responsiblemanufacturers. In the interest ofreducing
administrative costs, therefore, nonmanufacturers should not ordhrily ba
held liable to injured consumers.
Id (citations omitted).
See, eg., Vandermark v. Ford hlotor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171-72 (Cd.1964) fielding
that both retailer and manufacturer may be strictly liable, with costs allocated among
defendants).
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successfully explained what marginal improvement in safety is
gained when compared to the safety levels that follow from a
manufacturer's already existing incentives to avoid liability costs
associated with suits against it directly, as practically all modern
products liability suits proceed.
Likewise, the argument that no fairness is lost in such a system
because an affected nomanufacturing seller can always seek
indemnification from the upstream manufacture^?^ fails to
recognize important economic practicalities. The reality is that
such sellers, who are ultimately liable for perhaps five percent of
the damages paid out in products liability verdicts and settlem e n t ~ : ~must
~
routinely spend sizeable amounts of money to
escape from their ordinarily nominal inclusion in suits that
normally only involve liability issues between the injured plaintiff
and the manufacturer. Thus seen, a substantial aspect of the
efficiency argument favoring the nomanufacturing seller provision
of the Reform Act is its reduction in the tertiary accident costs
associated with having such sellers defend suits in which they will
be required to respond in damages in only a small percentage of
cases.

IV. ASSESSMENTOF APPLICATIONOF CORRECTIVEJUSTICE
AND EFFICIENCYPRINCIPLES TO SELECTED
RESTATEMENT
AND TORTREFORMPROVISIONS
In this Section, I seek t o summarize the qualities and the defects,
in terms of both the corrective justice-morality and the efficiencydeterrence models, of the selected Products Liability Restatement
and Reform Act provisions discussed above.

See, e.g., ARK. CODEANN. 8 16-116-107 (Michie 1987) (providing seller causo of action
for indemnity from manufacturer); Hales v. Monroe, 544 F.2d 331-32 (8th Cir. 1976)
(upholding indemnity from manufacturer to seller and distributor in claim alleging negligent
failure to discover defect); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Shaw's Sales & Serv., Ltd., 579 P.2d 48, 60
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (finding distributor appropriately indemnified by manufacturer whoro
latter was timely notified but failed to appear in first action), discussed in S. REP. NO. 105-32
at 34 n.109 (1997).
263 See The Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 565 Before thc
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, a n d Tramp., 10th Cong. 361-62 (1995) (testimony of M. Stuart Madden)
(noting studies demonstrating that after taking into account actions for indemnification,
sellers ultimately are liable for only five percent of damages).
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The new Restatement's treatment of warnings fares well under
both corrective justice and efficiency principles. The core consideration under both analyses is the model of informed consent, a tenet
the Products Liability Restatement carries fonvard with fidelity to
the decisional law. With the requirement that a seller provide
adequate warnings or instructions where necessary to permit the
user a true choice as to whether to use the product or to have
others use it, the Restatement recognizes the personal freedom and
autonomy requisites of the morality basis of corrective justice.2M
The cognitive limitations-based "obvious risk" quarrels raised by
Howard Latin265arise only at the periphery of warnings factfinding, and must be assumed to be resolvable and within the ken of
jurists and jurors, with the aid of expert evidence as appropriate.
Mark Hage?66 misperceives the task of a Restatement as being to
reform a body of law along one philosophical orientation or
another.267
From an efficiency perspective, the rule regarding adequate
warnings should be applied to manufacturers, but not necessarily
to other sellers. Absent substandard conduct on the seller's part in
failing to warn concerning a risk known to it but not to the
manufacturer, the manufacturer will typically be the creator of the
risk, and therefore logically responsible for taking measures that
will allow a user or consumer to make an informed choice, obviating all or most extra-contractual inefficiencies. Likewise, a
manufacturer will ordinarily be the least cost avoider, in that it,
rather than the purchaser or the intermediate seller, is presumed
t o be an expert in all knowable properties of the product? and

2M Regarding warnings, the Products Liability Restatement and the state lnv? it reflects
seem consistent with Sir Isaac Berlin's concept of npositive liberty," thnt is, thnt liberty
"which harnesses and concentrates freedom to achieve a higher good." Pnul Johnson,A Low
Risk Philosopher, N.Y. Thm,Nov. 12,1997, a t A31 (providing retrospective of life m d ~ i o r k
of the late philosopher).
Supm note 180.
266 Supm note 167.
267 The author confesses vulnerability to the same pull in suggesting thnt the mqjority
rule regarding risks open and obvious to adults but not to children be refnshioned to take
into account the scenarios described supm a t notes 196-204 and nccompnnying text. I dnim
a support for this proposition, however, a substantial body of decisional law.
See Bore1 v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973)
(holding manufacturer of asbestos to knowledge and skill of expert).
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will therefore ordinarily be in a better position than the user or

consumer to know and, as appropriate, remedy the risks.
Limited liability for nonmanufacturing sellers likewise proves
favorable from both corrective justice and efficiency points of view.
In terms of corrective justice, the Reform Act leaves a claimant
with the full range of remedies available ex ante. A suit against a
product manufacturer may proceed as before; should that suit be
frustrated by reason of manufacturer unavailability or insolvency,
recourse may be had against a nonmanufacturing seller as if it
were the manufacturer. Potential statute of limitations snares are
removed, as appropriate, as time expended in proceeding to
judgment against the absent or insolvent manufacturer is forgiven.
Express warranty and fault-based remedies against the seller are
preserved.
As regards efficiency, the arguments in favor of limiting nonmanufacturing seller liability are also seemingly unassailable. At no
cost to the plaintiff, the approach avoids the substantial tertiary
accident costs of bringing into the litigation as an initial matter a
seller who will not ordinarily be ultimately responsible in damages,
either through exculpation or through operation of indemnity or
contribution. The Reform Act's nonmanufacturing seller rule
seems, for these reasons, Pareto superior.269
Senate Bill 648's several liability treatment of noneconomic
damages is more troublesome. With respect to corrective justice,
if one subscribes to the view that joint and several liability was
employed initially to prevent the injustice of leaving a plaintiff with
only a partial remedy, or no remedy at all, against tortfeasors
acting in
its forced retrenchment may not seem facially
unjust, as only the rare modern products liability claim involves
concerted activity liability. Wright's poisoned coffee paradigm, on
the other hand, frames squarely the issue of the seeming injustice
of relieving all or part of the burden of compensatory redress from
the shoulders of the less culpable tortfeasor whose conduct
nevertheless was a sufficient cause of plaintiffs harm.271

zm See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text (explaining Pareto principles).
noSee supra note 207 and accompanying text (discussingjoint and several liability).
n1See supra notes 230-232 and accompanying text (discussing fairness of joint and

several liability).
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Moreover, Calabresi notes correctly that how several liability for
noneconomic damages fares in terms of corrective justice turns
upon reconciling a jury's ordinarily unscrutinized intent with a
judgment's unambiguous effect.n2 From a Kantian perspective
of equal rights--or what is sauce for the goose should be sauce for
the gander-the proposed approach evidences Posner's "political
observation with great emphasis on the "political"
and scant recognition of the "morality." In addition, just as the
contemporary multipoint analysis for evaluating "defect? has
been seen as an elaboration upon Hand's algebraic evaluation of
breach, so too comparative fault operates, in a significant may,
simply as a more polycentric methodology for measuring and
contrasting the parties' contribution to the harm, more supplely
and more fairly than the crude operation of the contributory fault
bar. Seen in this light, the advent of comparative fault gives no
rise to any imperative for a course correction regarding joint and
several liability.
An efficiency perspective of limiting joint and several liability to
economic damages may, as Calabresi suggests, shed little light,
unless we proceed to a different level of generality and put the
question as one of whether unfettered joint and several liability can
be considered wasteful. The least cost avoider approach, with the
premium placed on imposing liability upon the actor who can
remedy a risk least expensivelp permits the conclusion that it
is wasteful to require all tortfeasors, even those minimally a t fault,
to comport themselves as though they may bear responsibility for
the totality of a harm. As Judge Higgenbotham suggested in
T e ~ t b a n k ?once
~ ~ a tort rule's burden of potential liability bears
no intelligible relation to actions through which a party can reduce
risk, the deterrence attribute of the tort rule evaporate^.^'
See supm notes 243-245 (noting that fairness ofjury's decision depends on what they
intended and is therefore hard to discern fromverdict alone).
Supra text accompanying note 62.
274 See Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125,128-29 (Or. 1974) (listing seven fnctors used to
determine whether defect existed; factors aid "court in balancing the utility of the risk
against the magnitude of the risk").
n5See supm note 117 and accompanying text (discussing attributes of least cast nvoider
approach).
n6Louisiana er re.?. Guste v. h W Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th C
i.1985).
Id at 1029; see supm notes 138-141 and accompanying text (dis&ig Testbanh).
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Both corrective justice and efficiency tenets would be better
served by a solution such as that adopted in many states providing
for alleviation of joint and several liability when defendant's
contribution to the harm is less than a defined amount.278 The
least cost avoider approach and discouragement ofpost hoc coerced
transfer objectives would remain intact under such a modified
approach. At the same time, the plaintiff's paramount right to
compensation for proved tortious harm would not be stemmed
arbitrarily at the line separating economic versus noneconomic
harm, but rather at a more logical threshold based upon the
defendant's actual contribution to the harm, The deterrence
objectives of both corrective justice and efficiency would, in fact, be
best served by such a modified approach, as actors anticipating
conduct (or omissions to act) routinely gauge planned action not
upon considerations of potential liability for economic harm as
opposed to noneconomic harm, but rather upon evaluation of the
level at which their behavior is likely to be deemed a legal cause of
plaintiff's overall harm.279
In addition, a rule imposing several liability only for noneconomic
harm would seem to have no "justice" rationale whatsoever in
states where there remains the contributory negligence bar. This
rule imperils the plaintiff's recovery for proved harm by stripping
the claimant of a remedy upon evidence of plaintiffs incautious
conduct, even where that conduct bears only a small relation to the
overall causal sequence. Lastly, total abolition of joint liability for
noneconomic harm is a more drastic remedy than is necessary to
lessen the likelihood of a bizarre result such as that reached in
Di~ney.~~'
A confinement of joint liability to situations where a
defendant's contribution to the harm exceeds, for example, fifty
percent, would preclude the facially unjust imposition of a liability
judgment bearing no relation whatever to a defendant's participation in the wrongdoing. In the end, Disney should stand for no

5 16-64122(b) (Michie 1987).
The author must admit to taking a different position in testimony beforo tho Houso
of Representatives and the Senate in the course of hearings on predecessor reform bills
during the 104th and 105th Congresses. Based on my additional study of competing policy
objectives, however, I concluded that it was necessary to change my position.
Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198 (Ha. 1987). Recall that Disney is tho
case in which Disney was held liable for 86%of plaintiffs damages, though it was found only
1%responsible for the harm. Supm notes 234236 and accompanying text.
n8E.g.,ARK. CODEANN.
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proposition more broad than that odd cases make for bad legislation.

Corrective justice principles emphasize rectification, ~vhile
economic efficiency emphasizes wealth maximization.
The
approaches are in accord that "[tlhe ultimate goal [of accident law]
is to deter reckless or careless behavior[, as] [alny approach that
deviates from this goal threatens to defend or to generate a useless
This Article demonstrates that while corrective
set of rules.
justice may achieve deterrence only secondarily to its goal of victim
compensation, and while efficiency principles may recognize victim
compensation only as a corollary to an economic ideal, each is a
necessary aspect of optimal tort policy.
From either an economic or a corrective justice perspective, tort
law "sets limits within which individuals may permissibly act."282
Corrective justice, appropriately applied so as to hold liable in
money damages parties whose acts or failures to act were a legal
cause of a plaintif'Ps proved harm, satisfies societal objectives of
fairness and morality without which the law's coercive authority
would be repudiated. Moreover, despite frequent claims to the
contrary, corrective justice principles have been recognized
repeatedly by commentators and by courts as an engine of deterrence, and encouragement of the actor's "fair chance to avoidn of
which Holmes spoke.283
Efficiency principles, whether they embody 'kealth maximization" principles or any alternative construct, undoubtedly signal the
social opprobrium assigned to preventable accident ~ o s t s . ~
Counsel advising clients in any business sector of significance
already discuss economic principles of liability and the advisability
of behavior consistent with such liability risks. Calabresi's accident
cost rubric and cheapest cost avoider analysis is ordinarily
281 Keith N. Hylton & Steven E. Laymon, The Internalization Pamdux and Workers'
Compensation, 21 HOFSTRA
L.REV. 109,124(1992).
Jules L. Coleman,Legal Theory and Pmctice, 83 GEO.L.J. 2579,2587 (1995).
293 HOLn%,
supra note 36, at 115.
Supra note 112.
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operative without the need for empirical factfinding, and can be
applied readily by jurists not possessed of formal economics
training.285 Identification of liability rules, pursuant t o these
standards and generally understood, can operate to make thirdparty insurance acquisition more rational, and, where appropriate,
the need for first-party insurance more apparent and less wasteful.
The potential disjunction between rational business behavior and
ethics has long been recognized:86 and it is therefore not surprising that the objectives and effects of American Law Institute
initiatives have been questioned:87 as have the objectives and
'"See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text (discussing Testbank).
For example, cost-benefit analysis has been castigated as amoral in products claims
for chattel ranging from the Ford Pinto to the Dalkon Shield. See generally RONALD J.
BACIGAL,
TIIE L m m OF LITIGATION:THEDALKON SHIELD CONTROVERSY(1990). Bacigal
records that in the Dalkon Shield litigation, Judge Lord provided counsel for tho mnnufacturer with a copy of a speech he made containing the observation that "the only reason offorod
for corporate behavior was a bottom-line oriented cost-benefit analysis." "For examplo,"
Judge Lord continued, "ifthe cost to society from Dalkon Shield injuries totaled $50 million,
and the cost of making the Shield safer was $100 million, then improving the Dalkon Shiold
was not cost effective." Id. a t 29 (citing Hawkinson v. A.H. Robins Co., 595 F. Supp. 1290,
1309 (D.Colo. 1984)).
Cf: Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rule Making
Process of Private Legislatures, 29 GA.L. REV. 909 (1995). Schwarcz's evaluation of tho
Uniform Commercial Code revision processes could, with the substitution of "Americm Law
Institute Restatement projectsn for "the Code," be applied for equal insight into tho Products
Liability Restatement and other Institute pursuits:
Dozens, sometimes hundreds, of lawyers and academics periodically meot,
usually for days at a time, to debate the myriad of rulemaking proposals that
are advanced. This effort goes on for years. It takes anywhere from threo to
five years for a statutory change to have been studied, drafted, and first
proposed for legislative enactment. This requires an enormous devotion of
human and professional capital. . .
Another flaw in the rulemaking process is that it creates an unintended
momentum for change. Although at no point vrithin the process is chango
technically a foregone conclusion, the investment of time represented by the
creation of a study committee, its solicitation of comments and suggestions,
and its preparation of a report, create an incentive to revise the UCC, even
where, objectively, change may be unnecessary.
Id. at 917-19 (citations omitted). Schwarcz adds, importantly, the arguments of Robort E.
Scott, The Policies ofArticZe 9,80 V k L. REV. 1783,1816-21 (19941, that UCC rulemaking
processes are "susceptible to pressure from cohesive interest groups." Id. at 919 & n.26.
Calabresi and Cooper predict, I think incorrectly, that the Products Liability Restatement
will fail to gain widespread adherence in the judiciary: "[Tlhe Restatement's influonco
depends upon whether courts pay attention to it, which in turn depends on whothor tho
Restatement actually reflects what is happening in the courts. And it is doubtful that this
particular Restatement has much support in the courts." Calabresi & Cooper, supra noto 14,

.
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potential effects of federal tort reform l e g i ~ l a t i o n .Yet,
~ conceding such imperfections, it follows that in neither the corrective
justice-morality analysis nor the efficiency-deterrence analysis do
we reasonably expect perfect justice or perfect efficiency. Rather,
the objective is t o identify optimal achievable objectives in both.=
The so-called dichotomy between the corrective justice-efficiency
analyses is by no means clear.290 In substantial measure, efficiency principles promote autonomy, and corrective justice principles promote deterrence. The autonomy interests conventionally
associated with the corrective justice-morality synthesis are
furthered by the liability and deterrence components of the Hand
formulation, as stated originally or as reconceptualized as a modern
economic principle, and will ordinarily be vindicated in a finding of
liability against an actor found to be the cheapest cost a~oider.'~~
Likewise, an efficiency-based interpretation of a finding of negligence can be harmonized with societal disapproval of wasteful
conduct.292 Gary Schwartz has noted that tort's goal of deterrence, "seen as a way of achieving the somewhat austere goal of
economic efficiency, . . . also has deep roots in a humane and
compassionate view of the law's functions.n293Calabresi, in turn,
concedes that "compensation remains a fundamental aim of

a t 866-67 (citations omitted).
283 See genemUy Shuchman, supm note 125 (discussing various criticisms of present
system of tort reform).
283 CfiPRODUCIS LIABILITY REWATE~ENT,
supm note
2 cmt. n (The emphnsis is on
creating incentives for manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of safety in designing and
marketing products.").
See Schwartz, supm note 28, a t 1820.
291JohnB. Attanasio, ThePrinciple ofAggregaleAutommy and the CalobresionApproach
to Products Liability,74 V k L. REV. 677,707-08 (1988). Attannsio explnins:
In a real way, [the Calabresian] theory appeals to autonomy. In Cdnbrcsi's
world, the lam is simply attempting to strike a propitious balance between
liberty and order to preserve autonomy for as many individuals in society as
possible. Both the best decider and internalization theories nfford primnry
importance to the physical integrity of the individual.
Cdabrcsinn theory
overtly appeals to autonomy.
292 See supm note 112 (discussing Posneis efficiency theory of liability lntqr).
293 Schmartz, supm note 28, a t 1802; cf G.W.F. HEGEL,
-ON
IN HISTORY 92 (Robert
S. Hartman trans., 1953) C m h e highest point of a people's development is tho rational
consciousness of its life and conditions, the scientific understanding of its laws, its system
of justice, its morality.").

1,s

...
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accident
Ideally, this Article has contributed to rebutting
the argument of some that economic or utilitarian concerns have so
submerged modern tort, and perforce, products liability analysis so
as to render discussion of corrective justice or morality almost
quaint .295
It may be stated broadly that for such accident litigation that is
not preempted by statute, resolved by a regulatory compliance
defense, or mediated by private or public insurance, there is a
seeming societal and judicial acceptance that the highest and best
objectives of tort law are a reduction in accident costs and the
achievement of justice between and among the parties. As stated
in the introduction to this Article, concepts of legal pragmatism
provide a meanin@ opportunity to reconcile correctivejustice and
efficiency principles. In early observations on the centrality of a
pragmatic assessment of law, Holmes stated: "The object of our
study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the
public force through the instrumentality of the courts.~ ~ 2 9 6
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 22, a t 44.
E.g., George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LI~~ILITE
P E R ~ P E C ~ ~AND
V EPOLICY
~
184 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford winston eds., 1988). Priest
asserts:
Virtually all courts and commentators have embraced the goals of accident
reduction and insurance that correspond to the principal economic effects of
the law. There are only two important economic effects of any legal rule: a
rule can provide incentives to reduce the accident rate and, for accidents that
cannot be prevented, a legal rule can provide a form of victim compensation
insurance tied to product sales. Although there are occasional references to
fairness and equity, courts in products cases have largely focused on theso
two economic goals alone in their elaboration of the law.
Id. a t 185 (citations omitted).
2ss Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.L. REV. 467, 467 (18971,
reprinted in PRAG~~ATIsM:
A READER 145,145 (Louis Menand ed., 1997) (emphasis added).
In Holmes's words:
The reason why [law] is a profession, why people will pay lawyers to argue
for them or to advise them, is that in societies like ours the command of tho
public force is intrusted to the judges in certain cases, and the whole power
of the state will be put forth, if necessary, to carry out their judgments and
decrees. People want to know under what circumstances and how far they
will run the risk of corning against what is so much stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this danger is to be
feared.
Id. Posner comments approvingly upon Holmes's development of pragmatic analysis.
Richard k Posner, A Pragmntist Manifesto, in THE PROBLEhlS OF JURISPRUDENCE 454,46364 (19901, reprinted in PRAG~~ATIs~~: A READER, supra, at 418, 429-30. As Posner states,
za CAWIBRESI,
295
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In the context of describing the tenets of "pragmatism," William
James defined "truth" in these terms: "mdeas (which are themselves but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as
they help us to get into a satisfactory relation with other parts of
our e~perience."~~'
To be regarded as "true," an idea or a philosophy need only be true "in so far forth," i.e., for so far as the idea
goes.298 It follows that both corrective justice and efficiency
principles must be regarded as "true" in that they hold significant,
albeit nonexclusive, predictive value in anticipating the development of tort jurisprudence. Legal pragmatism permits us to
recognize the importance of corrective justice principles even while
conceding that the approach has marginal limitations in its
deterrent effect. Similarly, efficiency principles are true and
valuable from the standpoint of legal pragmatism as they provide
an underlying rationale for numerous modern accident cases, even
though issues of individual justice or community consensus as to
the morality of conduct may not be at the leading edge of the
economist's interests.
Individual tort rules, be they the three discussed in this Article
or others, must satisfy broader civil justice goals than simple
efficiency or corrective justice. Such a broader tort goal may be
the conjunction of lam and economics principles with those of
corrective justice and morality. In the end, a tort rule that annuls
a defendant's unjust enrichment and compensates a wrongfully
injured plaintiff but only at an extravagant societal cost, will be
rejected as irrational, as will a tort rule, however efficient and
broadly utilitarian, that fails to dispense justice to the injured
party?99 Thus seen, efficiency and corrective justice principles

"HoImes's prophecy of 1897 is in process of being fulfilled at long last" I d at 466 n.5.
m ~ I L L MJl~ I E S
PRAGMATISM
,
(1907), reprinted in PRACLIATlSht A A E R , supra note
296, at 93,100 (emphasis omitted).
z?a Id
idea upon which we can ride, so to spenk; any idea thnt vrill carry us
prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other pnrt, linking things
satisfactorily. ..is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally Id.
zssEpsteii'sidea-experimentthat for simple plaintiffdefendanttort dnims in vrhich h t h
parties are partially at fault, a 50-50 proportionate responsibilitycould be applied nmss the
board, and without regard to individual adjudicationof comparative fault, might f d into the
category of a broadly utilitarian but too frequently individually unjust rule. See E m .
supra note 50, at 98-99 (discussingutility of equal apportionment).
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operate and will continue t o operate in a beneficial symbi0sis,3~~
each a check and a balance upon the other, with each as a necessary, but neither a ~ufKcient,3~~
rationale for modern accident law
objectives.

Werner Z. Hirsch also argues that these two theories frequently dovetail:
[Seemingly] fundamental differences in premises and approach [between
orthodox tort analysis and efficiency principles] turn out to be reconcilablo
and can often be brought into harmony. For example, it can be argued that
the 'rational' man in seeking his self-interest takes into consideration the
effect of his decision on others to the extent that their reaction makes an
impression. In this manner, we can explain how a person can be rational and
at the same time altruistic. In the more technical language of the economist,
we would say that the effect of one person's decision on others can enter as
an argument into the first person's utility function.
HIRSCH, supra note 101,at xviii.
Cfi Bobby Jindal;Relativism, Neutrality, and Transcendentalism: Beyond Autonomy,
57 LA L.REV. 1253,1270(1997).
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Senate Report 105-32sets out this description of the twelve-year
effort to pass broad-spectrum tort and products liability reform
legislation:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
"S. 648 was introduced on April 24, 1997 by Senators Gorton,
Ashcroft, McCain, Lott and Abraham. Although S. 648 is similar
to S. 5, which bears the same title, there are important differences.
S. 5 was introduced on January 21, 1997, by Senators Ashcroft,
McCain and Lott. The text of. . . S. 5 is identical to that of the
Conference Report of the product liability bill from the 104th
Congress. That Conference Report mas vetoed by President
Clinton.
"On March 4,1997 Senator McCain chaired a Committee hearing
on product liability reform. On March 6, 1997, Senator Ashcroft
chaired a hearing of the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs,
Foreign Commerce and Tourism to explore the success of the
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994. That bill provided a
statute of repose for general aviation aircraft.
"The. Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation
favorably reported S. 648 by a roll call vote of 11to 9.
"The Committee has a long history of involvement with product
liability reform. In the Committee's early treatment of the subject,
it reported three bills, each of which was introduced by Senator
Kasten. S. 2631 was reported by the Committee in the 97th
Congress (S. Rep. 97-670), and S. 44 mas reported by the Committee in the 98th Congress (S. Rep. 98-476). Congress adjourned
without Senate action on either of these measures.
"At the beginning of the 99th Congress, on January 3, 1985,
Senator Kasten introduced S. 100, the Product Liability Act. This
bill preempted state lam to impose uniform federal rules and
standards of liability governing the recovery of damages for injuries
caused by defective products. The legislation mas substantially the
same as S. 44, which had been reported by the Committee during
the 98th Congress.
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"A Consumer Subcommitteehearing on S. 100was held on March
21, 1985 (Serial No. 99-84) and the bill was reviewed by the
Committee at an executive session on May 16, 1985. At that
session, the motion to report the bill was defeated by an 8-8 vote.
"Prior to the May 16,1985 executive session, two amendments in
the nature of a substitute to S. 100 had been introduced. One of
these amendments (S. Amdt. No. 16) was introduced by Senator
Dodd on March 19, 1985, and the other (S. Amdt. No. 100) was
introduced by Senator Gorton on May 14, 1985. These amendments were complete substitutes for S. 100 that preempted certain
aspects of state law and also established alternative expedited
claim systems for limited recovery of damages in product liability
cases. Hearings on the Dodd and Gorton amendments were held
by the Consumer Subcommittee on June 18 and June 25, 1985
(Serial No. 99-177).
"After these hearings, the Committee staff was instructed by the
Chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator Danforth, t o draft
a proposal that combined elements of all these measures. After
review of extensive comments received from the public in connection with the Committee's first draft, a second draft was released
on November 20, 1985. This draft was formally introduced by
Senator Danforth on December 20,1985, as S. 1999. This bill was
the subject of two days of hearings before the Consumer Subcommittee on February 27 and March 11,1986.
"On April 30,1986, Senator Kasten introduced an amendment in
the nature of a substitute for S. 100 (S. Amdt. No. 1814). This
amendment embodied recommendationsfor product liability reform
that had been made by the administration's Tort Policy Working
Group.
"On May 12,1986, Senator Danforth introduced an amendment
in the nature of a substitute for S. 1999 (S. Amdt. No. 1951). This
amendment replaced the expedited claim system of S. 1999 with an
expedited settlement system and made a number of other changes
in S. 1999. On May 20, 1986, Senator Gorton introduced an
amendment in the nature of a substitute to the Danforth amendment (S. Amdt. No. 1968). On May 19 and 20,1986, the Consumer
Subcommittee held hearings on the Kasten amendment, the
Danforth amendment, and the other product liability measures
before the Committee.
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"On June 3,1986, the Committee began its markup of product
liability legislation. The markup draft bill was an original bill that
embodied the provisions of the Danforth amendment to S. 1999.
On June 12, the Committee adopted an amendment in the nature
of a substitute for the original markup draft bill. On June 12,19,
24,25 and 26,1986, the Committee continued its consideration of
the amendment and added a number of other amendments before
reporting S. 2760 as an original bill. S. 2760 came before the full
Senate on September 17, 1986. On September 25, the Senate
agreed to the motion to proceed to S. 2760 by a vote of 84 to 13.
The bill was returned to the Senate Calendar, and no further action
was taken.
'The primary activity on federal product liability legislation in
the 100th Congress occurred in the House of Representatives. On
February 18,1987, Congressmen Bill Richardson and Thomas A.
Luken introduced H.R. 1115, which was referred to the House
Energy and Commerce Committee. The Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection and Competitiveness held extensive
hearings on the need for federal product liability reform and on
specific issues in the bill on May 5, May 20, June 18, July 21,
August 6, October 7, and December 17, 1987. The Subcommittee
met to mark up the bill on November 18,19, and 20, and December
3 and 8, 1987. H.R. 1115 was reported by the Subcommittee, as
amended, on December 8, 1987, by a vote of 11to 3. On May 10,
12,18, 19, and 24, June 1,2, 8, 9, and 14,1988, the Energy and
Commerce Committee met to mark up H.R. 1115, voting on June
14 to report H.R. 1115, as amended, favorably by a recorded vote
of 30 t o 12. H.R. 1115 then received a sequential referral to the
House Committees on the Judiciary and on Education and Labor.
The Education and Labor Committee held a hearing on September
27,1988, on provisions in H.R. 1115that affected workplace safety.
The House Judiciary Committee took no action on the bill in the
100th Congress. The sequential referral ran through the end of the
session, so the 100th Congress adjourned without considering H.R.
1115 on the floor of the House.
"During the lOlst Congress, the Committee held three hearings
on S. 1400,the Product Liability Reform Act, introduced by Senator
Kasten (S. Hrg. 101-243). On May 22, 1990, the Commerce
Committee reported an amendment in the nature of a substitute to
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S. 1400 by a roll call vote of 13 to 7 (S. Rep. 101-356). The full
Senate took no action before the adjournment of the lOlst Congress.
"In the 102nd Congress, Senator Kasten introduced S. 640 on
March 13, 1991. There were 36 cosponsors of the bill, including
seven members of the Committee. On September 12, 1991, the
Consumer Subcommittee held a hearing on S. 640 and the full
Commerce Committee held a second day of hearings on S. 640 and
S. 645, The General Aviation Accident Standards Act of 1991, on
September 19, 1991. On October 3rd, the Committee favorably
reported 8. 640 by a roll call vote of 13 to 7.
"On May 7,1992, the provisions of S. 640 were incorporated into
an amendment offered by Senator Kasten to S. 250, the National
Voter Registration Act. On May 14, the amendment was tabled by
a vote of 53 to 45. On June 26, the bill was sequentially referred to
the Committee on the Judiciary until August 12. The Judiciary
Committee held a hearing on August 5th but took no further action.
Under the terms of a unanimous consent agreement, on September
8, the Senate began consideration of a motion to proceed to consider
S. 640. On September 10, the Senate failed to invoke cloture on
the motion to proceed by a vote of 57 to 39. A motion to reconsider
that vote was agreed to by a vote of 57 to 39, and a subsequent
cloture vote failed 58 to 38. No further action was taken.
"In the 103rd Congress, Senators Rockefeller and Gorton
introduced S. 687, The Product Liability Fairness Act, on March 31,
1993. The Consumer Subcommittee held a hearing on S. 687 on
September 23, 1993 (S. Hrg.103-490). On November 9, 1993 the
Committee ordered S. 687 favorably reported by a roll call vote of
16 to 4. The bill was taken to the floor and on June 28, 1994 a
motion to invoke cloture failed 54 to 44. On June 29,1994 a second
motion to invoke cloture failed 57 to 41.
"In the 104th Congress, Senators Jay Rockefeller and Slade
Gorton introduced, on March 15,1995, S. 565, the Product Liability
Fairness Act. On March 10, 1995, the House of Representatives
had passed legislation, H.R. 956, the Common Sense Product
Liability and Legal Reform Act of 1995, by a vote of 265 to 161. On
April 3 and 4, 1995, the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs,
Foreign Commerce and Tourism held hearings on S. 565 (S. Hrg.
104-435). At the Committee executive session on April 6,1995, the
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Chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator Pressler, offered
an amendment in the nature of a substitute that maintained the
original content of S. 565 but, among other things, incorporated as
Title 11, S. 303, The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act. S. 303 mas
introduced by Senators Lieberman and McCain on January 31,
1995, and was referred to the Commerce Committee. On April 6,
1995, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation favorably reported S. 565 as amended by the Chairman's
mark by a roll call vote of 13 to 6 (S.Report 10469). The bill mas
taken up by the Senate on April 24,1995 and was approved by a
vote of 61 to 37 on May 10,1995.
"A Conference Report, H.R. 956 the Common Sense Product
Liability and Legal Reform Act of 1996 mas issued on March 14,
1996. The Conference Report was very similar to the bill originally
passed by the Senate. The Senate approved the Conference Report
by a vote of 59 to 40 on March 21,1996. The House of Representatives passed the Conference Report on March 29 by a vote of 259 to
158. The President vetoed the bill on May 2,1996."
S. REP.NO. 105-32, at 15-19 (1997) (citations omitted).
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